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論文題目：聖經莎樂美的禮物經濟 
指導教授：蘇子中 
研究生：陳建龍 
論文內容提要： 
本論文旨在以禮物經濟的概念，重新解析、閱讀新約聖經中莎樂美的故事，
以期對故事中人物之間的良性的關係或負面的糾葛能有深層的認識，甚或顛覆性
的解讀。而禮物經濟的中心關懷，正是人類全體的社會建構、關係締結、文化生
成的複雜脈絡，如此解讀莎樂美的故事，也將使該故事透過禮物經濟的觀點，成
為人類共同關係與集體經驗的縮影。反之，透過該故事人物間的重重關係，也令
包羅萬象、令人費解的禮物經濟理論，得到具體的說明與文本的驗證。 
論文正文共分五部分：除導言與結論部分之外，共計五章。第一章點出莎
樂美故事所具備的禮物論述特質，並說明禮物理論對該故事的適用性；第二章延
伸禮物傳統的負面論述，展開正面的解析，並說明禮物的良性特質與母親經驗的
共同點；第三章重返禮物的負面論述，以人際與經濟關係來視其暴力結構；第四
章探討禮物多義性，處理禮物所具有的正向、負向，甚至無法定位的狀態；第五
章討論禮物背後可能的真義，以思想家論禮物之不可能而最後可能的辨證途徑，
來理解並結論禮物論述的最終要旨。 
除論文中所採用的莎樂美故事外，本文第五章的部份亦伴隨其他零散段落
探討聖經中亞伯拉罕的故事。除延伸思想家的論述外，也一併就禮物理論的結
構，探討兩個故事之間的雷同。為求解析、論述之周詳，與聖經相關之文本考據
同為本文著力之處，惟與正文相去甚遠之處，盡皆以註納入，以供酌參。 
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English Abstract 
This thesis aims to provide a theoretic reading of the biblical story Salomé. The 
theory intended is that of the gift economy. The application of gift theory in the 
interpretation of the story is to bring out a synergistic effect by and for these two: 
while the theory helps to shed a new light on the ancient tale, the ancient tale helps to 
provide analogies for better understanding of the forward theory. The story and the 
theory are employed to their mutual benefit. 
This thesis is composed of five major sections, with each section forming a 
chapter. In addition to the introduction and the conclusion, the five chapters are: 
“Matching Mauss,” “The Good Gift,” “The Bad Gift,” “The Gift in Between,” and 
“The Gift of Death.” Each subsumes a few assertions related to the gift discourse. 
Various thinkers are discussed along with some of the most influential assertions 
under the chapter title. 
“Matching Mauss” is to point out the matching points between the story plot of 
Salomé and Mauss’ gift theory; “The Good Gift” is vaguely titled to encompass 
thinkers who hold positive thoughts toward the gift; “The Bad Gift” is likewise titled 
to read the dark side of the gift; “The Gift in Between” is devoted to the discussion of 
the gift that denies any categorization; “The Gift of Death” is to focus on the concept 
of the impossibility of the gift and also the possibility of gift through death. While all 
the first four chapters are to show a way around for the understanding of the gift, the 
last chapter alone shows a way to a potential destination of the gift. 
Besides the gift theory, alongside the story of Salomé, the biblical story of 
Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac to God is also discussed. Biblical allusions are sought 
and proved meticulously in the reasoning of the thesis. It is textually therefore meant 
to be a study of the biblical literature. 
Key words: the gift, gift economy, Salomé, biblical literature Dahn  7
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Salomé with the Head of John the Baptist (Madrid) by Caravaggio 
 
 
 
“There is much that may be said about Caravaggio’s own obsession with what 
Jacques Derrida refers to as ‘the gift of death’…” 
 
—Davide Panagia
∗— 
 
 
                                                 
∗ A quote from “The Effects of Viewing: Caravaggio, Bacon, and the Ring.” Theory & Event, Volume 
10, Issue 4 (2007): 15. This is so far the only connection made between Salomé and the gift theory 
among the published documents. To Mr. Panagia I hold my gratitude for his unintended acquiescent 
support, like a genuine gift. Dahn  10
Introduction 
Gift as a generic term 
In any contemporary discourse, every gift begins with Marcel Mauss. Ever since 
the publication of The Gift in 1925, gift has become a significant subject for critics 
and thinkers. Mauss’ talk on gift was ensued by George Bataille and Emmanuel 
Levinas, continued respectively by Pierre Bourdieu and Lewis Hyde, and finally taken 
onto a different level by Jacques Derrida. Other renowned thinkers of our time, Hélèn 
Cixous for example, continue to make both focused and occasional contributions to 
this discourse in ever-refreshing viewpoints and keep it enlivened. It is to be noted, 
though, that each thinker contributes to the discourse of gift with a different twist. 
There are times when, under the umbrella term “gift,” dissimilar reasonings deviate 
from the original Maussian concern in their own particular ways. 
Among the thinkers, discrepancies over the notion of gift seemingly deny any 
generalized or conflated gift theory in any form, and this makes it difficult to seek one 
coherent definition thereof. Gift, to Mauss, following the teaching of Émile Durkheim, 
serves as a means to understand a streak of cultural universality; to Bataille, gift offers 
a field for discourse of excess; to Levinas, it is another whetstone to sharpen his keen 
critiques concerning otherness; to Bourdieu, it is, through the obligation it entails, an 
imposition of violence; to Hyde, it refers not only to the presented object in exchange 
but also the talent granted to the creative individual; to Derrida, it is the impossible 
and beyond. 
Salomé 
The name Salomé in this thesis refers to the daughter of Herodias and Philip in 
the New Testament, not Salome the disciple of Jesus.
1  Originally, the name of the 
                                                 
1  The disciple Salome is the one who was present at the crucifixion of Jesus, as recorded in Mark 
15:40. Dahn  11
former is not recorded in the Bible. In both accounts of the same biblical story, she is 
referred to as the daughter of Herodias. The name is allegedly given by Titus Flavius 
Josephus (A.D. 37-c.100) and ever since recorded and followed by many authoritative 
sources for Christianity including Easton’s Bible Dictionary, Fausset’s Bible 
Dictionary, and The Catholic Encyclopedia. 
Even though the name is not mentioned where the story is recorded (respectively 
in Matthew 14:1-12 and Mark 6:16-29), in this thesis this female character is still 
contingently referred to as Salomé. Except for the fact that this name helps the direct 
address to this said character, this character has long claimed a literary life of her own, 
let alone a name of her own. The story of the dancing Salomé is handed down through 
generations. Her story becomes even more fascinating after Oscar Wilde’s rendition. 
The adoption of this ready name is neither ungrounded nor inappropriate. 
The two accounts of the same biblical story of Salomé bears little difference 
between each other. The major difference between the two accounts is caused by their 
different focuses on details. Therefore in the discussion of this thesis, either may be 
quoted according to the need of specific details. 
In this thesis, any discussions of and allusions to Salomé is confined within the 
biblical text alone. Any other inspired works or remotely related development of the 
story is not to be taken into consideration. The existent biblical text provides the only 
textual source for the gift discourse in this thesis. 
Thesis statement 
This thesis aims to attempt an interpretation of the biblical story of Salomé 
through the viewpoint of the gift theory. Numerous features of the story encourage 
such an attempt and the overall reasoning appears feasible. The story shall be 
understood as a gift circle and each specific part of the story shall be taken as a link in 
the circle. While the gift theory encompasses diverse schools and discourses, the Dahn  12
various links in the story call for the need of such diversity. Major theorists in the 
field of gift theory are covered in the reading of the story in order to bring out as 
many levels of significance as possible. 
The first chapter “Matching Mauss” purports to single out the gift features 
observed in the biblical story and how they are related to Mauss’ gift discourse. This 
chapter focuses on the four major ideas of Mauss’ discussion: potlatch, obligations, 
kula and hau. Among them, obligations are further divided for discussion into: the 
obligation to give, the obligation to receive, and the obligation to reciprocate. 
The birthday celebration held by King Herod is considered a potlatch in the logic 
of gift economy; obligations are discussed in terms of the interactions between King 
Herod, his courtiers, and Salomé. The gift circle which involves every character in the 
story is understood as kula, and the force that drives along the gift-giving from one to 
another is recognized as hau, or the spirit of the thing given. 
Besides the matching features between the story and the theory, another basic 
concept of the gift is also introduced: the imposition of reciprocity. One of the most 
salient aspects of gift economy is the postulation that every gift aims to demand a 
return. The gift is therefore, according to Mauss, not a mere expression of generosity, 
but a disguised request for a returned favor or anything similar in another form. This 
is the part that leads Derrida all the way to his conclusion that there is no possibility 
for a genuine gift. This observation of a request or demand disguised as a gift is taken 
into consideration in reading the relationships between characters in the story. 
Another concept significant in the gift discourse is the blurred distinction 
between the gift and the giver. By presenting a gift, the giver is actually presenting 
part of his/her mind. The more emotionally involved the giver is, the more he/she is 
giving part of himself/herself to the recipient. The blurred distinction between the two 
serves to explain the complicated soul of the gift, hau. In addition, in the story of Dahn  13
Salomé, the gift of dance is a perfect example of such a blurred distinction in that the 
gift of dance must be presented through the body of the giver. It is literally a gift made 
from the giver. 
Chapter Two is loosely titled as “The Good Gift” for the purpose of subsuming 
several related points of view in the filed of gift theory. The word “good” in the title 
refers to the positive views on the gift as something benevolent other than a malicious 
imposition of demand for an equivalent return. Another aspect of the “good” views is 
that they see the possibility of a true gift with no obligations attached. These positive 
views are assumed respectively by Levinas, Cixous, and Hyde. 
The Levinasian gift addresses otherness. Levinas’ other is the baby yet to be born. 
A genuine gift that asks for no return is possible in his discussion of the gift of birth. 
While the mother gives birth to a baby, the baby is an actual being of the unknown. 
From the unknown no possible demand can be made; the gift must be a completely 
unselfish devotion. The relationship between Herodias and Salomé is clarified in 
terms of such universality between all mothers and children. The Levinasian gift is a 
good gift for it is a gift of generosity from a nurturer to an unknown life. 
The second part of Chapter Two deals with Cixous’ view on the gift as a 
gendered issue. Not only does Cixous further contribute to the discussion of the gift of 
birth, she also puts forth the idea of the distinction between the feminine gift and the 
masculine gift. Her division of the gift economy into “the Realm of Proper” and “the 
Realm of Gift” tells of the sharp contrast between sexes as givers. According to 
Cixous, the Realm of Proper is operated by economic concern—namely, a masculine 
fear, while the Realm of Gift is operated by generosity, in which the practice of giving 
a genuine gift is possible and common. Through her reasoning, the gift of birth is 
further proved unselfish, and the male economic world is where the gift turns false 
and malicious. The Cixousian gift is a good gift, because it is a feminine gift of Dahn  14
generosity. 
The third part of Chapter Two ushers in Hyde’s idea of art as a gift. This is one of 
the rare views on the gift that facilitates the discussion of Salomé’s dance as a gift. 
The Hydean gift of art emphasizes the transient nature of art as part of art’s definition. 
While Hyde’s view is strongly connected with the aestheticism of music, the 
similarity between music and dance allows application of his observation to Salomé’s 
dance. Due to the nature of the discussion of the section, the stage performance of the 
dance of Salomé is partly analyzed through some recourse to Artaud’s understanding 
of the performance art. The Hydean gift is a good gift, in that it is a gift of art. 
Chapter Three is entitled “The Bad Gift” in order to emphasize the negative side 
of the gift frequently pointed out by Bourdieu among other scholars. Bourdieu 
maintains that the gift is an imposed burden to the point of being a form of violence. 
In his understanding of the gift, the most intriguing, most treacherous side of the gift 
is “officialization,” the legitimacy of such violence. Gentle, invisible violence is 
practiced with the permission and encouragement by the society. “Obligation,” 
“loyalty,” and other “names of virtue” are planted in our minds to enforce such 
violence and to convert the originally benevolent gift into a malevolent demand. The 
distinction between a gift and a commodity is also clarified in this section. The gift of 
birth from Herodias to Salomé alongside the gift of dance by Salomé on behalf of 
Herodias is discussed in this perspective. Through the view of Bourdieu, Herodias’ 
motherhood is placed under analysis for a close look of its defilement. 
Ambiguously entitled to match the ambiguity in the Bataillean gift, Chapter Four: 
“The Gift in Between” deals with the theoretic polyvalence of Bataille’s view on the 
gift. A Bataillean gift is mutable by nature. Bataille’s view on the gift is based on his 
idea of expenditure. Expenditure is capable of offering a positive gift, a negative gift, 
or even a neither/nor gift. When expenditure takes on the form of monetary Dahn  15
squandering, the gift may be negative; when expenditure takes on the form of artistic 
creation or fulfillment of righteousness, the gift may be positive; when expenditure 
takes on the form of discharging the excess, the gift becomes a necessity to the giver 
and others may benefit from this gift of discharge out of no good will. In the third 
case, the gift is a vague, neither-nor gift which does not take sides. 
The later half of Chapter Four is composed of a focused discussion of the death 
of John the Baptist. Two focuses of this discussion are: 1. How the death of John is a 
Bataillean gift? 2. How does Bataille’s idea of the gift reveal the death of John as a 
multifold gift for Herod, for Salomé, for Herodias, and even for Jesus? This 
discussion is not a mere Bataillean reading of gift economy in the story; it is at the 
same time a furthered elucidation of the Maussian hau that travels from person to 
person in the circle of gift. 
Chapter Five is the last chapter of the thesis. This chapter is mainly devoted to 
the discussion of the two most influential points of Derrida in gift theory: the gift as 
the impossible and the genuine gift of death. While the first point is contended in 
Given Time, the second one is expounded through the famous Derridian reading of the 
story of Abraham in The Gift of Death. 
This chapter proposes an overall structure of the gift discourse. The discourse 
can be wrapped up in the perspective that it is an extended dialogue between Mauss 
and Derrida, with various scholarships devoted to a mutual exploration for an ultimate 
answer. This answer is the answer to the question first posed by Mauss—what 
universality do we see in the gift/giving? Many provide their findings and thinking; 
many follow Derrida’s footsteps in Given Time and deny such a possibility of the 
gift/giving. The ultimate answer brought forth by Derrida himself in The Gift of Death 
is more humanistic than deconstructive—love. Love is the only thing capable of 
making the impossible possible. Love answers to John’s death and Salomé’s sin. It is Dahn  16
through love that the gift of John’s death is finalized and realized; it is through love 
that Salomé lends herself to shoulder the moral burden on Herodias’ behalf. 
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I. The Gift of Mauss 
In the biblical story of Salomé, there are significant forms of exchanges taking 
place between the characters. These exchanges affiliate the characters in the story in 
various manners. The diversity of their manners matches that of their effects. Among 
them, perceivable are the exchange between King Herod and his lords and captains, 
the exchange between King Herod and Princess Salomé, the exchange between 
Salomé and Herodias, among others. The first chapter attempts to present the 
matching features between the biblical story and the Maussian gift economy, so as to 
unfold a viable discussion in search of the gift economy in the noted biblical tale. 
Potlatch, obligations, kula, and hau 
To understand the biblical story of Salomé in light of Mauss’ idea of gift as an 
exchange economy, a few concepts need to be explained before further discussion. 
Among the numerous terms and ideas subsumed under Mauss’ gift economy, 
“potlatch,” “obligations,” “kula,” and “hau” are indispensable in elucidating a 
Maussian reading of the Salomé story. Only a full understanding of the four terms can 
prove significant such an application of Mauss’ viewpoints to the biblical story. 
A comprehensive explanation of the term potlatch is thus recorded by Mauss: 
The word potlatch essentially means ‘to feed,’ ‘to consume.’ These 
tribes…spend the winter in a continual festival of feasts, fairs, and markets, 
which also constitute the solemn assembly of the tribe…Everything—clans, 
marriages, initiations, Shamanist séances and meetings for the worship of 
the great gods, the totems or the collective or individual ancestors of the 
clan—is woven into an inextricable network of rites. (6) 
Over all these practices stated above, according to Mauss, prevails the principle of 
rivalry and hostility between the tribes. It is said that during the potlatch season, legal 
and economic services are enacted and sometimes involve killing of chiefs and nobles. Dahn  18
Potlatch, therefore, on the part of the chief, “takes on an extremely marked agonistic 
character” (6). It is a festival event that allows the chief to pride himself over others 
but at the same time entails death and danger if certain cultural codes are violated. 
The idea of “obligation” is central to Mauss’ discussion of gift and potlatch. As 
he points out, “The obligation to give is the essence of the potlatch” (39). He further 
divides this obligation into three types by their motivations: the obligation to give, 
the obligation to receive, and the obligation to reciprocate. The three types of 
obligations become the major streaks of Mauss’ view on the gift theory and are also 
most frequently applied to literary and cultural criticisms concerning the theory. 
The obligation to give is binding on the chief in that he can only maintain his 
authority and rank over his tribe, village, and even family by proving that his wealth 
is abundant enough to put others to shame and that he is fully capable of spending it 
on the potlatch. Other members of the tribe are also obligated. The idea of sharing 
among the tribal members obligates them to invite others to share even the “windfall 
gains of the hunt or food gathering” (ibid). The fact that among these tribes exists the 
mythological tale in which a chief who defies his obligation to give a potlatch suffers 
from a rotten face shows that the obligation to give is an inviolable social code in 
Mauss’ studied culture. 
The obligation to receive and the obligation to reciprocate are indeed inextricable. 
As Mauss explains, “The obligation to accept is no less constraining. One has no right 
to refuse a gift, or to refuse to attend the potlatch. To act in this way is to show that 
one is afraid of having to reciprocate” (41). In most situations, each gift and invitation 
must be received and praised. Violations of such a code can only be exempted under 
very rare circumstances.
2  While some are obligated to give, others are obligated to 
                                                 
2  According to Mauss, “an acknowledged position in the hierarchy, and victories in previous potlatches, 
allow one to refuse an invitation…or even,…to refuse a gift without war ensuing. Yet then the potlatch 
becomes obligatory for the one who has refused; in particular, he must make even richer the ‘festival of Dahn  19
receive. When one receives the gift, one assumes the obligation to reciprocate: 
A gift is received “with a burden attached.” One does more than derive 
benefit from a thing or a festival: one has accepted a challenge, and has 
been able to do so because of being certain to be able to reciprocate, to 
prove one is not unequal. (41) 
This is a compulsory favor-cycling relationship imposed by the social code, as 
elucidated in The Gift. 
The obligation to reciprocate is likewise imperative. On the one hand, one cannot 
afford to refuse a gift; one the other hand, one cannot enact taking without giving. It is 
this third obligation that makes the compulsory nature of Mausss’ gift theory even 
more salient. The obligation to reciprocate when demanded comes with mandatory 
destruction of equal values. Though there are times when a person is not obligated to 
reciprocate while receiving a gift from his superior, in the potlatch, every gift 
demands a return at present or in the future.
3  Any violation of the third obligation is 
taken seriously. As Mauss observed, “the punishment for failure to reciprocate is 
slavery for debt” (ibid). In other words, the failure to fulfill reciprocation is not only 
taken as a moral flaw but also a culpable infringement. 
While explaining kula, Mauss refers to it as a means for intertribal trade, and he 
furthers his assertion based on Malinowski’s research and says, “Malinowski gives no 
translation of kula, which doubtless means ‘circle’” (21-22). For Mauss, what renders 
kula significant is the fact that it serves as a metaphor to itself—a symbolic circle 
serves as a perfect metaphor to present that all the things given and taken, all the 
people as givers or receivers, and all the rituals and exchanges…all these are well 
                                                                                                                                            
fat’ where this ritual of refusal can in fact be observed” (41). In short, a refusal of gift is never made 
easy. 
3  Examples given by Mauss in his research including the case where one receives a blanket from the 
chief at the potlatch and is later obligated to return two at the wedding of the chief’s daughter (ibid). Dahn  20
caught up in a circle. What really goes around this circle is “a regular movement in 
time and space” (22). Yet, what traps everything in the circle, or in the circular 
movement? Near the end of his discussion of kula, Mauss concludes, “all in all, it is 
mechanisms of obligation, and even of obligation through things, that are called into 
play” (23). 
While the potlatch develops around obligations and obligations traps tribal or 
social members in the circle of kula, hau acts as a further emphasis on obligations. 
Hau, as Mauss explained in The Gift, is the spirit of something given. It is hau that 
enforces the circulation of gift. Once I receive a gift (or taonga, the object itself), I’m 
bound to give you a taonga in due course. It is not the same gift I return. What I 
return is the hau. Therefore hau is deemed as the “spirit” of the gift. It is not the gift 
per se; it is the “good will to give” that later makes you a giver in return (11). To this 
point, it is easy to confuse obligations with hau. One major difference is that while 
obligations go between two parties, hau travels from one giver/receiver to another. 
Obligations designate the social expectation imposed on the receiver of gift to be 
a giver sometime in the future to return something of equal or higher value when a 
certain interest is demanded. To decline this social expectation is to constitute 
culpability. Obligations thus drive people to reciprocate. In the field of obligations, 
both parties, the giver and the taker, are indispensable as participants to fulfill the 
game of exchange. Hau, on the other hand, is not limited between two parties. It starts 
from one to two and it moves on to the third and more. Mauss makes clear the idea of 
hau with an example: “you give me one [gift]…and I pass it on to a third party” and 
the third party will eventually be turned into another giver because he is “impelled to 
do so by the hau my present possesses” (11). 
Hau is therefore taken by Mauss for a “spiritual power” (ibid). It is not a 
two-way exchange; it is able to take on a winding, circular journey. The more Dahn  21
participants are involved in the circle, the less significant they are. All participants are 
anxious to do the same thing as if enchanted to—to pass on the hau. The significance 
of the participants in the act of transporting the hau is accordingly reduced. They are 
mere vehicles for the transportation of hau, mere vessels for the spirit of gift. That is 
to say, obligation functions between identified, specific individuals, and yet hau 
haunts a whole body of culture and its community with a much stronger summoning 
power and bends everyone in it to help along its journey. 
A Maussian reading of Salomé 
In the biblical story of Salomé, features that match Mauss’ observation of gift 
economy abound. The idea and practice of exchange prevails. There is an exchange of 
identify between John the Baptist and Christ; there is an exchange between Philip and 
Herod for Herrodias’ spouse; there is an exchange of a mother’s right and a 
daughter’s obligation between Herodias and Salomé ; there is an exchange between a 
head and a dance; there is an exchange between the identity of a living prisoner and 
that of a dead saint in one person, to name only a few. The scene begins with a 
potlatch; obligations monitor the event; the hau travels from Heriodias’ motherhood 
to John’s sainthood. Everyone in the story is involved and trapped in the kula, the 
symbolic circle of exchange. 
The first exchange takes place in the misrecognition of Christ’s fame for that of 
John the Baptist: “At that time Herod the tetrarch heard of the fame of Jesus, and said 
unto his servants, This is John the Baptist (King James Bible, Matt. 14.1-2). Herod is 
somehow convinced that “it is John, whom I beheaded: he is risen from the dead” 
(Mark 6.16). The premise of the story is simple: John accuses Herod for marrying 
Herodias, the wife of her own brother, Philip. This obviously irks Herodias more than 
it does to Herod as the story later unfolds itself:   
For Herod himself had sent forth and laid hold upon John, and bound him in Dahn  22
  prison for Herodias' sake, his brother Philip's wife: for he had married her. 
For John had said unto Herod, It is not lawful for thee to have thy brother's 
wife. Therefore Herodias had a quarrel against him, and would have killed 
him; but she could not. (Mark 6.17-19) 
At the news of Christ’s expelling devils and healing the sick, related miracles are 
attributed to different personae. Some believe that a prophet is coming to perform 
those acts of miracle; some believe that it must be Elijah; Herod is convinced by 
himself that it is no one else but John the Baptist (Mark 6.14-16). 
It is obvious that Herod has himself become a locale of exchange where the 
miracles of Jesus are interchangeable with the morality of John. However, this story is 
told in the Bible in a reverse order and with a flashback. The interchangeability of 
Jesus and John results from the previous happenings in which Salomé takes part. 
To begin with, the whole story starts with a potlatch. It was a birthday 
celebration held by King Herod for himself: “And when a convenient day was come, 
that Herod on his birthday made a supper to his lords, high captains, and chief estates 
of Galilee” (Mark 6.21). The banquet is in form and in fact an equivalent to a potlatch. 
It is an assertion of authority. The birth of King is thus distinguished from the birth of 
the rest. It is a nativity that deserves note and delights all. The invited courtiers are 
summoned to witness the grandeur of the event and are succumbed to it. This 
celebration occasion is such a one that aims to feed and to feast and this is the king’s 
privilege. The logic of such an assertion of authority, or the logic of potlatch, simply 
denies the possibility that anyone else in court may hold a similar feast to feed his 
guests as heartily and generously. 
The birth celebration of King Herod is not a celebration of birth per se. The birth 
is only the extension of a recognized identity. A birth matters only when the identity 
does. It is therefore a celebration of King Herod’s identity as the supreme ruler of the Dahn  23
court. As Ken Jackson points out in his observation, the “Big Man” or “the chief’s 
excessive gifts, in other words, prevent any reciprocation and establish his superiority 
to rivals by demonstrating his different social position in the exchange network” (38). 
Hence, King Herod literally held a birthday party for himself. His birthday is a mere 
occasion scheduled on his timetable for an authority-reminder. 
Although in the biblical story a King presides over the celebration instead of a 
chieftain, an in-court feast is given instead of a potlatch out in the open, and lords and 
captains are invited instead of sachems or tribesmen, the nature of the potlatching rite 
stands intact in Herod’s banquet. As previously quoted, the word potlatch “essentially 
means to feed”; so does Herod’s “supper.” It is not surprising how the act of feeding 
successfully transforms itself into a symbol of authority in ancient or primitive 
communities. The ability to fully sustain oneself and then to feed others affirms the 
owner of such ability to claim his authority of a nurturer, a provider, a king—namely, 
a hand that feeds.
4 
In its most primitive form, gifting is performed through feeding. As King Herod 
wields his feeding hand, the court becomes a feeding ground. All who feed on this 
hand shall obey and be grateful. On this feeding ground, Herod’s authority is 
confirmed and consolidated by giving a generous banquet. By Herod’s act of gifting, 
the trio of obligations is also staged. There is no free “supper,” for the hand that feeds 
also obligates. 
The obligation to give, initiated by Herod, leads to the obligation to receive—an 
obligation to be assumed by the lords and captains, and eventually, leads on to the 
third obligation—the obligation to reciprocate. In the case of the lords and captains, to 
                                                 
4  While here the king is metaphorized into a potlatching hand in the gift economy, Mary Douglas sees 
the whole idea of gift on a large scale through a similar metaphor. In her foreword to The Gift by Mauss, 
she argues, “The gift cycle echoes Adam Smith’s invisible hand: gift complements market in so far as it 
operates where the latter is absent…Mauss’s fertile idea was to present the gift cycle as a theoretical 
counterpart to the invisible hand” (xiv). Dahn  24
obey the king’s summon to the banquet is to perform the obligation to receive. They 
come to be fed and to witness the all-nurturing power. By receiving the invitation to 
the royal supper, they succumb themselves to the king and further assure his power 
over them. Present at the court, the lords and captains serve as the “pedestal” for the 
“statue” of the king. Above them, Herod stands. 
Yet, it is when the king stands above the courtiers as the statute stands above the 
pedestal that a third obligation to reciprocate triggers the whole vortex of gifting and 
involves all parties in the cycling of gift, kula. 
When all seems well balance in the gift economy starting with Herod’s potlatch, 
the third obligation tips the scales well maintained by the king’s obligation to give and 
the courtiers’ obligation to receive. Salomé, as the performer of the obligation to 
reciprocate, offers to dance and does so. Let her motivation be left for later discussion 
and the consequence of her dance be dealt with first. As is narrated in the Bible: 
And when the daughter of the said Herodias came in, and danced, and 
pleased Herod and them that sat with him, the king said unto the damsel, 
Ask of me whatsoever thou wilt, and I will give it thee. And he swore unto 
her, Whatsoever thou shalt ask of me, I will give it thee, unto the half of my 
kingdom. (Mark 6.22-23) 
The king gives; the courtiers receive and believe; the daughter receives and 
reciprocates. The courtiers are cemented under the authority of the king. The king 
achieves such consolidation of power by commanding them to witness and experience 
the potlatch. The act of receiving the royal supper is not to be taken as passive. It is 
the very first step toward the rise of a kingdom. Through such witnessing of power 
they realize their inferiority to a leader and serve him. Accordingly, the king shall 
before them commit himself to the role of an absolute leader. Yet, Herod’s promise to 
Salomé in front of “them that sat with him” is about to put his authority to the most Dahn  25
crucial test. 
Here in the context, the seemingly insignificant presence of “them that sat with 
him” asserts an indispensable importance. The witnesses of the power, the “them” 
here, are the fundamental structure of the gift economy. They have witnessed the 
giving power of the authority and believed. Now, they are again put on another 
witness of the same power, or a greater power, because their belief in it makes it 
larger than before. 
The king gives food to the courtiers; the courtiers give him their belief and 
obedience in return; for this belief and obedience of theirs, the king must always 
maintain his unswerving determination to give and impeccable ability to offer. But he 
regrets his promise. Note that here Salomé has not yet been taken under discussion. 
The tension is all built between the king and the courtiers. If Herod denies the request 
of “whatsoever unto half a kingdom,” the foundation of the kingdom shakes. The king 
cannot afford to let the cornerstone of his authority crumble. As there is no free supper, 
there is no free support. In the gift economy, everything demands a return, and it is 
such demands that achieve consolidation. Mari Lee Mifsud’s reading of Mauss offers 
an explanation pertinent to this circumstance: 
Mauss’s work shows there are no free gifts: a gift economy creates for 
members permanent commitments that articulate the dominant institutions 
of law, politics, culture, and interpersonal relations. The theory of the gift is 
a theory of human solidarity. (89) 
The key word here is “solidarity.” Here in the context means unification, a monolithic 
entity, just like a political entity, a kingdom. The commitments are always two-way. 
The courtiers are obligated to receive the king’s gift and obligated to be the 
king’s proof of authority. By fulfilling their duties, the courtiers in return monitor the 
king to keep good his role as a giver with authority whom they can always believe in. Dahn  26
Loathing and unwilling, the king cannot but fulfill his promise and execute John the 
Baptist in order to stand firm in front of his courtiers. The promise to Salomé is not 
fulfilled for the sake of Salomé; what sees Herod to have this done is the 
commitments, the bond of obligation between the king and the courtiers. A bond of 
gift is a bond of compulsory power. It is a bond that binds two parties at the cost of 
any unilateral interest or concern; it is a mandatory bond. So far, the fact that the 
tension is built exclusively between the king and his courtiers specifies the major 
difference between obligation and hau. While the former communicates two parties; 
the latter travels from one onto another.
5 
The potlatching act empowers Herod as a giver. The giving obligates his 
courtiers to be recipients. The recipients give their obedience in return. That 
obedience obligates Herod to be in power. The structure of gift economy is both 
coercive and flexible. It is coercive because of the obligation in it; it is flexible 
because the coerced is interchangeable. While studying the power struggle between 
sexes and lovers, David Cressy, in his Birth, Marriage and Death, describes his 
observation of gifts as means to control a lover in a way conducive to our 
understanding of the gift-binding structure between Herod and his courtiers: “A gift 
could be coercive as well as affectionate, its symbolism open to flexible construction” 
(263-264). The coercive nature of gift economy stays firm regardless of the form it 
takes on. 
In this manner, the courtiers reciprocate. Although it appears as if the presence of 
the courtiers at court traps Herod in a dilemma where he has to fulfill a promise he 
                                                 
5  It is to be noted that Salomé’s obligation to reciprocate along with her request of John the Baptist’s 
head does not enter the bond of obligation between Herod and his courtiers. It does not and it can not. 
Obligation, as aforementioned, is binding only on two parties. Salomé’s dance and request catalyze the 
fulfillment of mutual obligations between the two without getting involved. The binding obligation 
between Herod and Salomé is less about consolidation of authority than sacrifice of what one favors. 
One may find striking similarities between the execution of John by Herod and the sacrifice of Issac by 
Abraham when scrutinized under a Derridean reading. cf. “Whom to Give to,” The Gift of Death. Dahn  27
regrets. The function of such a monitoring threat by the inferiors to the potlatching 
king is the function to maintain his absolute authority. The consistency in the giver’s 
generosity must not alter. The courtiers as believers in Herod’s authority thus serve as 
affirming auxiliaries to help along such an authority. The believed receives aid from 
the believer. The authority is authorized through such a particular form of 
reciprocation. 
In the circle of Herod’s potlatching banquet, a even more conspicuous 
reciprocation precedes and follows the one stated above—the dance of Salomé. The 
dance first puts Herod to a test of his authority and then afterwards triggers another 
bond of obligation between Herod and Salomé. Maybe to this point, the story at the 
beginning comes even clearer. In the story where the chief refuses to fulfill his 
obligation as a potlatch giver has his face rotten. The denial of such an obligation 
exclusive to the wielder of authority comes at the cost of the loss of face. Here, too, 
Herod’s denial of Salomé’s request would have been at a risk of face loss, though 
figuratively. 
While the courtiers reciprocate with their monitoring presence and Herod 
benefits from it for his authority, Salomé reciprocates in some other way that the bond 
of obligation does not end in Herod’s benefit in turn but the bond is furthered into a 
even complex circle, a kula. The bond of obligation between Herod and Salomé is 
derived from anxiety before it develops into kula. In the biblical story, anxiety comes 
from the dilemma which forces Herod to execute a revered saint John, whom Herod 
wants alive; in theory, anxiety has long been observed and believed to go in parallel 
with the gift.    “Gift-giving,” according to Pamela S. Hammons, “was often depicted 
as anxiety-ridden in early modern English texts” (35). The phrase “gift trouble” which 
echoes this observation is exactly coined to state such a fact by Natalie Zemon Davis. 
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excessive domination by the donor,” and in the end, such practices of gift-giving may 
result in “bitter quarrels, humiliation, and unresolved conflict around the nature of 
reciprocity” (10).
6 
In the case of Salomé, what threatens to collapse the previously balanced 
relationship of obligation is not a rival, quarrel, or humiliation, but a “conflict around 
the nature of reciprocity.” The conflict comes between Herod and Salomé with John 
the Baptist as the mutual concern. Herod wants him alive; Salomé wants him 
beheaded (at least by now, before a further discussion of her obeying Herodias’ order). 
In this circle of gift, Salomé is bound to reciprocate as the courtiers are. This is one of 
the basic rules in gift economy: “a gift transforms the recipient into one who must 
reciprocate, one who owes” (Mauss 37). 
Salomé presumably “owes” Herod long before the birthday banquet. He is her 
acting father, in every sense of the word “acting.” After he drives his brother Philip 
away, Herod supposedly acts like/as Herodias’ husband and Salomé’s father. In the 
original biblical story, the lecherous desire for Salomé is absent in the description of 
Herod. When one lays aside the vivid description of Herod’s lascivious leer in Oscar 
Wilde’s Salomé, the only emotion aroused between Herod and Salomé is that “the 
daughter of Herodias danced before them, and pleased Herod (Matt. 14.6)” or “when 
the daughter of the said Herodias came in, and danced, and pleased Herod and them 
that sat with him (Mark 6.22).” These two terse descriptions show no sign of the 
possibility that Herod’s state of being “pleased” can be understood as fulfillment of 
sensuous “pleasure.” Therefore the potential sensuous attraction of Salomé to King 
                                                 
6  In Hammons’ studies of gift, Davis is singled out for her contribution to the concept of “gift trouble” 
and “obligation anxiety” (Hammons 35). Both scholars focus on the negative connotation of gift in 
various cultures and in different times, though Hammons mentions her indebtedness to Davis. Such an 
act is no doubt another reminder that all things come down to the gift economy as asserted by Bourdieu, 
Derrida, and also Hyde when he speaks of artistic creation and academic studies. For more on “gift 
trouble,” exampled by the 16
th-century France, please see “Gifts Gone Wrong” by Davis. For a third 
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Herod shall be left untackled, as the complications in between is already thickened. 
As a foster child in a sense, Salomé is bound by the obligation to reciprocate. 
The birthday celebration of Herod is of course another given item involving her as a 
recipient, and yet it is even more significant as an opportunity for her to show her 
gratitude by participating in this celebration in a way more active than others, for 
example, by a performance, a dance. Our discussion does not lead directly to Herod’s 
reception of the dancing performance, rejoices and promises another gift. An 
emphasis has to be made that the dance performed by Salomé is itself a proper gift in 
the logic of gift economy.
7 
The logic lies in that “a gift is not…a free expression of generosity, but the 
embodiment of complex gesture of interpersonal economy” (Massey 17), as Alan D. 
Schrift reasserts Mauss’ point in the Introduction to The Logic of Gift, “the gift is 
given in a context in which both it reception and it reciprocal return are obligated in 
terms of well-articulated social rules” (4). Godelier’s viewpoint further confirms such 
necessity of giving, receiving, and reciprocating acts in motion. Societies of gift 
economy “operate primarily on the principle of the production and maintenance of 
personal relationships; these relationships can be between individuals of the same or 
different rank, and power is frequently a fundamental factor in those relationships” 
(12). Salomé’s dance is an embodiment of a benevolent gesture contributing to 
interpersonal economy; Salomé’s dance articulates social rules; Salomé’s dance first 
appears to aim to produce and maintain personal relationship, and in the context, 
power is frequently a fundamental factor. 
It is in this Maussian sense that Salomé’s dance serves as a proper gift in the gift 
                                                 
7  Here the proper gift refers to the proper Maussian gift. For Marcel Mauss, Gabriel Herman, Maurice 
Godelier, Aafke E. Komter, and sometimes Pierre Bourdieu, gift-giving is an act that contributes to the 
social structure and interpersonal relationship. For Levinas and Cixous, birth may be the only proper 
gift; for Derrida, the gift is the impossible; for Hyde, dance or music can be proper gift, with theoretical 
assertions traceable back to the Renaissance times. See “Hyde’s Gift of Art” in the later chapter. Dahn  30
economy initiated by Herod’s potlatch. It helps the circle of gift-giving. It therefore 
helps the social construction and the balance in court. In short, it answers to the call. 
Furthermore, the dance is a proper gift in its form though not in delay. The original 
Maussian idea is that at the potlatch, a gift in return must serve to communicate a 
relationship but not to compete. Any deviation from the rule, if taken lightly, can 
imply war or death in a primitive community; in a modern society, breach of 
relationship (41-42). To avoid this, Pierre Bourdieu suggests the often-quoted 
“deferral and difference”
8—the former refers to the interval of time between the gift 
and the countergift, while the latter refers to the dissimilar natures between the two. In 
other words, a timely return of an identical item will be taken as a refusal or 
humiliation instead of a friendly participant gesture. The gift of dance from Salomé is 
by nature different from her guaranteed survival in the royal household and different 
from her allowed presence at the birthday celebration. It certainly does not contribute 
to competition or challenge of authority anyhow. The nature difference of her gift of 
dance is offered proper in form and timely in public where a demonstration of 
authority is made clear. Even more, Salomé chooses a compelling gift form. She 
manages an irreplaceable gift. 
The gift of dance must be dedicated to the king in Salomé’s physical presence, a 
presence granted by the king. That is to said, Salomé, under the permission of Herod 
to be present on this occasion, shows her presence in a dedicative posture. The 
presentation of such a docile body immediately recognizes the royal grace of the king 
and salutes such a grace with an ultimate self-dedication. The dance is a symbolic 
                                                 
8  First appearing in Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977, 5-6) which is later republished as The Logic 
of Practice (1990, 105), the streak of Bourdieu’s reasoning is found similar to that of Derrida’s. 
Bourdieu emphasizes on both the difference in time and in kind; Derrida only finds the difference in 
time appealing to him. As Derrida follows the path of time, he eventually concludes that the only gift is 
the gift of time, and that human time inevitably deals with death, and that the only gift is the gift of 
death. The cursory and weak reasoning here does not justify the complication of Derrida’s theory. It is 
only a contingent briefing of the idea of “delay” in gift economy since the subject is to be left for later 
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self-dedication performed by Salomé. Its meaning is two-fold. 
First, it is irreplaceable. It is the presentation of a body passed on from a 
previous authority (Philip’s daughter) allowed its survival at present (Herod’s court). 
It is a body of gift. To offer her own body through dancing is a declaration to the 
potlatch-giver (to Salomé also a life-giver) that she remembers and is grateful. While 
Mauss says figuratively, “by giving, one is giving oneself” (46), this is literally a 
perfect embodiment of Mauss’ point. The body of gift as a countergift is irreplaceable 
for its existence is given by the king-giver and now presented in another form to 
please the king-receiver. The gift economy never runs through its course once and 
stops. Once it starts, it hardly stops. Thus, the interpersonal relationships and the 
social construction evolve. 
Second, the dance is on the other hand a dedication of the body of a maiden. 
Namely, it is a traditional offering to gods (salient, if not self-evident). It does more 
than pose a humble gesture to the authority, more than a grateful posture to the 
life-giver, but furthers itself to flatter the giver into a god. The dedication of the 
maiden’s body, imitating the virgin sacrifice long before biblical times, offers to turn a 
donor into a deity. The authority of a worldly king is elevated to that of a superhuman 
being. 
The relationship between Herod and his courtiers falls into the bond of obligation; 
so does the relationship between Herod and Salomé. Both relationships are bilateral. 
Obligation is binding on only two parties. So far, the above discussion is limited on 
concerns of obligation. The gift-giving vortex which sucks in all parties is kula, a 
locality where the participants witness the gift economy complicate and the 
interpersonal relationships thicken. In the story, the hub that binds all three (Herod, 
Salomé, the courtiers) and leads all into kula is the usually negligible audience of the 
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Mauss does not elaborate on kula. Through his understanding, it literally means 
“circle.” Besides mentioning “Malinowski gives no translation of kula” (21-22), 
Mauss compares it to potlatch and says, “the kula is a sort of grand potlatch” (ibid), as 
if the difference in between is a matter of scale. The truth is, what matters here is not a 
detailed definition of kula available for distinguishing it from other concepts in gift 
economy. It is its image of circle that renders this term its significance in our 
understanding of gift economy. It speaks of the basic and total idea of gift 
economy—it calls all givers/recipients into play. All become part of the circle and are 
conditioned to help the circulation.
9 
When King Herod gives his courtiers invitations and his courtiers in return pay 
their visit, the kula does not yet take shape. When King Herod offers Princes Salomé a 
life secured in court along with a presence at the celebration and Princess Salomé 
shows her gratitude and offers a gift of dance, the kula does not yet take shape. It 
takes the involvement of all parties to form the kula. For a kula to take shape, the 
bond of obligation needs to be extended beyond the two-way reciprocity. All parties 
involved must simultaneously develop a trilateral or multilateral network of 
relationships in which hau travels from one onto another. When all community 
members interact with each other and hau goes on its trip, the kula is formed. As 
Herod offers lodging to Salomé and Salomé rewards him with dancing, it is yet 
obligation between the two; however, when the courtiers, as coincidental audience to 
                                                 
9  It may be noteworthy that Mauss’ anthropological study, under the influence of Durkheim, commits 
itself to the goal of seeking the key to certain totality in all human cultures. This totality is universal 
and ubiquitous. All human cultures and societies function, following such totality. As Peter M. 
Whiteley draws our attention to Mauss’ study, “the great analytical virtue of Mauss’s approach to 
gift-exchange was to draw attention to the ‘totality’ of effects within a social system” (361). The 
totality present in each culture and society coincides with hau that travels from one giver to another. 
While Mauss focuses in a considerable discussions on kula, he never mentions or notices the fact that 
all human cultures and societies are taken by him as parts and bits in his extended kula of anthropology 
in which all human communities interact with each other, directly or indirectly, through one spirit, in 
one mind. The hau-in-kula study in gift theory is itself a vivid and vivacious metaphor to the 
Maussian/Durkehimian sociological studies. The totality they seek is a form of hau; the kula within in 
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this gift dance, and they later impose an imperative sense on Herod to fulfill his 
promise to Salomé, the act of giving deviates from its original two-way single channel 
and involves a third party. A third party is present in a new, derivative interaction. The 
kula takes its shape the moment such deviation sucks in all three. Hau starts to 
function. 
Hau, as aforementioned in page 4, is “the spirit of something given,” “a spiritual 
power”: 
[…] hau, a spiritual power. You give me one of them [taonga, or goods], 
and I pass it on to a third party; he gives another to me in turn, because he is 
impelled to do so by the hau my present possesses. I, for my part, am 
obliged to give you that thing because I must return to you what is in reality 
the effect of the hau of your taonga. (Mauss 11) 
It is a spirit, a haunting power; therefore it may come in various forms. The form 
never matters; the spirit does. The object given does not matter; the driving force to 
give does. In this manner of assuming diverse forms and of befalling on one 
individual after another, hau is on its way. According to Mauss, hau is in a sense a 
possessive, haunting specter that drives people to give and into the circle of gifting. It 
denies any exorcism. To give is the only way to let out (ibid). 
Before the discussion of hau furthers itself to read the story of Salomé, it is 
necessary to take a pause and make the point that Mauss, without a doubt, is 
considered the one of the pioneering scholars in the filed of gift theory. To say he is 
the founding father of this realm is far from exaggeration. Yet, his theory and studies 
are not completely agreed upon by all later scholars. There are disputable findings and 
reasonings left to be further scrutinized. Among them, his understanding of hau is 
probably the most famous, if not infamous. 
Levi-Strauss, for example, in his “Introduction à l’oeuvre de Marcel Mauss” Dahn  34
utters pungent criticism concerning Mauss’ understanding of hau as literal explanation 
of the aboriginal “face value” (a metaphor found fit by Peter M. Whiteley in his 
discussion of this anecdote; 396) of the word. Another example is Annette Weiner. In 
Inalienable Possessions, especially in pages 45-65, her critique is devoted to accusing 
Mauss of his inconsiderate, incomprehensive interpretation of hau. While Derrida, 
questioning the very premise of the Maussian gift theory, holds his doubt fast: “Mauss 
does not worry enough about this incompatibility between gift and exchange” (Given 
Time 13, 37). As for a specific opinion concerning hau, Derrida is probably only 
interested in it as a “force” and follows the streak to show how “gift only gives to the 
extent that it gives time” (Given Time 40-41). This observation is too agreed by 
Britton J. Harwood: “For Derrida, the ‘most interesting idea’ of Marcel Mauss’s Essai 
sur le don is ‘the requirement of restitution at term’…The requirement of the 
circulatory difference is inscribed in the thing itself that is given or exchanged” (14). 
The inscribed requirement here exactly refers to hau. And the restitution at term refers 
to the giving of time, a core idea around which the Derridian gift is developed. 
In the preceding paragraph, only a few scholars are mentioned among a myriad 
of many others. Nevertheless, through the mentioned few, the acceptance of the 
Maussian hau may be better understood. What may not be ignored is the fact that 
other scholars in this field also voice their justifications on behalf of Mauss. In 
general, as Jeff Massey points out, “Mauss is universally credited with establishing 
the key elements of all modern gift theory” (17). Peter M. Whiteley too takes part in 
this defense of Mauss: “Mauss’s idea of the gift’s total social effects is helpful in this 
regard. However ethnographically flawed Mauss’s notion of Maori hau may be, the 
‘spirit of the gift’ retains enduring value for anthropological explanation” (397). 
Among the scholars taking sides with Mauss, Marshall Sahlins offers an in-depth 
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Does not the apparent ‘‘imprecision’’ of the term hau perfectly reflect 
a society in which ‘‘economic’’, ‘‘social’’, ‘‘political’’, and ‘‘religious’’ 
are indiscriminately organized by the same relations and intermixed in 
the same activities? And if so, are we not obliged once more to reverse 
ourselves on Mauss’s interpretation? Concerning the spiritual specifics 
of the hau, he was very likely mistaken. But in another sense, more 
profound, he was right. ‘‘Everything happens as if’’ hau were a total 
concept. (1011) 
This thesis aims to read the story of Salomé through various concepts of gift 
understood by different schools of thinking. Its goal, however, is not one that 
compares and contracts the natures of the schools and promotes any of them to be the 
ultimate feasible paradigm in this field. Quite on the contrary, the thesis seeks to 
synthesize all hypotheses and aims to tease out as many gift reading of the biblical 
story as possible. It is therefore found necessary to dedicate two long paragraphs to 
settling the possible doubt and dispute over Mauss’ take on hau. The reader is advised 
to the understanding that Mauss’ take is here taken as ours, and the understanding 
stands as that hau is the haunting spirit in the thing given and transforms the recipient 
into a giver to give further. 
In the case of Herod, hau travels through him in the route that first involves him 
as the initial giver, then the courtiers and Salomé, and then back again. In the whole 
biblical story, the route is much winding and involving. At a first cursory glance, the 
initial giver is not Herod. It is someone way before he ascends the throne. It is 
Herodias. Herodias is in the story plot the first giver and yet figuratively speaking, 
much more of a living embodiment of hau. She travels through other characters as 
hau. She is the gift trinity of the giver, the gift, and hau in one person. 
Herodias gives herself to Philip and thus assumes the queenship in return. By Dahn  36
marrying Philip, a new gift economy also takes place. Herodias, as the queen, gives 
birth/life to Princess Salomé. She then on the banquet gives a dance to Herod and the 
courtiers respectively. The drive to give goes on, as one may see, in a more 
complicated way.
10  The gift of dance turns out to be hau from Herodias to demand 
John’s death, and John’s gift of his head goes to where hau first sets off. To map out 
an oversimplified yet makeshift route of how hau travels would be as follows: 
Herodias → Philip → Salomé → Herod → Salomé/the courtiers → John → Herodias 
It is presumably the way hau travels in the gift economy of the biblical story and 
efforts are to be made to justify and elucidate such reading of this story, with each link 
apart and all links as a whole. 
To fully understand the possessive nature and involving force of hau and also the 
concept of it as a spirit or a soul, a shared observation among scholars needs to be 
made known—the blurred distinction between the gift and the giver.
11 
An earlier discussion of the gift economy in which the recipient of the gift is 
obligated to give, it is mentioned that “a gift transforms the recipient into one who 
must reciprocate, one who owes” (Mauss 37). It is obvious that the gift here distills its 
compulsory influence into the recipient. The recipient no longer claims a right to 
autonomy. The thing transgresses on the person. According to Pamela S. Hammons, 
“for Mauss, the primary significance of this blurring of boundaries between persons 
                                                 
10  For, if taken apart from the whole gift circle, as formerly dealt with, there are complications within 
complications, circulations within circulations. The gift circle is hardly a simple, stable economy that 
follows a one-dimensional pattern. Here, for example, there is in the plot a fact that Herodias later 
gives herself to Herod, Philip’s brother. She does not lose her previous queenship. Instead, by giving 
herself to Herod as a new queen, she receives a “renewal” of the supreme status. Also, another 
sidetrack of hau is found, as previously discussed, in that Salomé’s gift of dance is simultaneously 
given to the courtiers. Divergences abound, but in order to proceed our discussion, the main thread of 
reasoning (namely, what leads to the dance for the head) is taken first as to facilitate the development 
of discourse. These complications subsumed under the major ones shall be later treated in the following 
chapters where respective scrutiny finds fit. 
11  Besides the scholars quoted and listed here who support the idea of the blurred distinction between 
and the gift and the giver, there are others who employ this point of view in understanding other forms 
of gift-giving than those forms we survey here. Ewa Plonowska Ziarek, Lisa Guenther, and Emmanuel 
Levinas, for example, resort to this idea to interpret birth as a gift. See Ziarek 225. Dahn  37
and things is that it clarifies the logic behind the implicit obligation—even 
coercion—for reciprocity” (35). She later furthers her assertion to relate this blurring 
to the said “transformative power over persons” (ibid). 
This blurring of such a distinction certainly facilitates our understanding of the 
psyche aspect of gift, hau. While in other discussions related to primitive or ancient 
cultures, Mauss mentions some more extreme ideas other than the blurring of the 
distinction between the thing and the person. As he speak of the Maori culture, he 
maintains, “in Maori law, the legal tie, a tie occurring through things, is one between 
souls, because the thing itself possesses a soul, is of the soul” (12). He continues, 
“hence, it follows that to make a gift of something is to make a present of some part 
of oneself […] to accept something from somebody is to accept some part of his 
spiritual essence, of his soul” (ibid). The soul of the gift seems to evolve on its own 
from the moment the gift is given. This is a far more direct contribution to animate the 
living nature in the gift. Similar descriptions are also found when Mauss relates the 
social practice of the ancient Rome. In Roman law, gifts pledged “are things that 
themselves are animate […]. In this respect these additional exchanges express […] 
that coming and going of souls and things that are all intermingled with one another” 
(48). An inanimate object, at its given moment, comes to life. 
Outside the ancient cultures, Mauss’ observation of hau is taken over by 
Francisco LaRubia-Prado following a similar grain. While Mauss makes clear that gift 
economy is “the constant exchange of spiritual matter [hau]” (14), LaRubia-Prado 
employs an image of a wailing, wandering specter for hau: “the gift yearns for its 
return to the giver, to the original owner, and thus ensues a circular dynamic between 
gifts and countergifts, all wanting to return to their original course” (293). It is a good 
thing that such gothic understanding of hau is not to be followed through in that later 
in his reassertion of hau, LaRubia-Prado quotes Mauss to conclude that “in more Dahn  38
organic cultures a clear distinction between people and things does not exist (12)” 
(292). Such a keen perception does provide us a way to comprehend the idea of hau 
conducive to the discourse of gift economy where endless exchanges may occur. 
Outside the “more organic cultures,” Annette Weiner finds the phenomenon of 
such blurring of the distinction between the gift and giver still prevails. Weiner 
comments that “in general, all personal possessions involve an intimate connection 
with their owners, symbolizing personal experience that…adds value to the person’s 
social identity” (36).
12  She later even traces back to both Marcel Mauss and Georg 
Simmel and reminds us of an observation shared between them that “the boundaries 
between persons and things are not rigidly separate” (ibid). 
Mari Lee Mifsud, similarly and yet more perceptively, furthers such statement 
and likens it closer to the Maussian spirit of the gift, hau. It is the intimacy between 
the gift and the giver that offers us a logic behind such a statement, but it is also the 
“animistic quality” in the gift: 
[T]his intimacy [of gift economy] links the person to the thing, and vice 
versa, creating an animistic quality to the gift. The power of the gift is, in 
Maussian terms, a laying hold of both persons and things. In gift cultures, 
no absolute boundary between persons and things can be drawn. (93) 
As a follower of Mauss in this specific line of thinking, Weiner makes use of her 
discussion to explain and to agree with Mauss: “The thing is intimately connected to 
the person, hence ‘it is invested with life’” (ibid). 
So it is as one can see in the story of Salomé. The birthday celebration bears an 
impress of the king to make it mandatory to the courtiers. The obedient acceptance of 
the courtiers means order at court and political support because they are his very 
                                                 
12  Lewis Hyde holds a viewpoint quite similar to this one under discussion. See Gift: Imagination and 
the Erotic Life, 86. Also Hammons, 35. Dahn  39
subordinates. To date, this blurring of distinction works in its general, figurative sense. 
In the case of Salomé’s gift, such blurring of distinction is literally fulfilled and 
witnessed. The dance of gift is performed by the gift-body. The giver of the gift is in 
every sense a genuine part of the gift. The gift is presented to the king through gifting 
the giver herself. In other givers’ case, the gift is composed of part of the giver; in the 
case of Salomé, the gift is composed of the giver. The distinction between the gift and 
the giver goes way beyond blurring. It is not blurred. It is dissolved. 
In either case, the gift is significant only when it bears the mark of the giver. For 
the gift is a social item. It is always given inside a social network. As hau travels 
along, it not only takes different forms but also bears different identities along its way. 
This is the reason why in a discussion of hau, this said blurring of distinction between 
the gift and the giver must be mentioned alongside. Through this Maussian point of 
view, one comes to realize that the gift is part of the giver, an investment of life. 
It is impressive that how Mifsud later follows this logic and channels the flow of 
logic onto her discussion conducted in a Levinasian view. The thought-provoking 
declaration by her after the idea of the gift “invested with life” is as follows: 
Gifts always bear the traces of others, and of the past. Gifts link generations 
to each other, representing or portraying not so much a present value as the 
figure of past and future relations. Hence, the significance of gifts lies not 
so much in their material worth as in their creation of cultural intimacy and 
cultural memory. (Mifsud 94) 
The statement of “gifts link generations …as the figure of past” is definitely true of 
the gifting relation between Herod and Salomé. It is related to the hau that travels 
through generations. Salomé enacts the gifting circle of hau from the previous 
generation, from the past. It is overwhelming that in the Maussian reading of the 
biblical story, quite a few metaphors of gift economy come to Pricess Salomé and can Dahn  40
be perfectly understood in a literal sense. 
Literally or figuratively, “gifts,” as Mifsud expounds, “always bear the traces of 
other.” In the course of gift-giving, investments from the past and from other are 
handed down from one recipient/giver to another. In other words, the act of giving is a 
contact with other, an initiation of intake of other into the recipient. When the 
recipient is transformed into a giver and starts to give, he immediately assumes the 
role of other and forces part of him into the gift, and consequently forces his otherness 
into the next recipient. Logically speaking, the act of giving adds something of 
otherness to the recipient and hence causes a certain change. The change may be 
irrecoverable as Mifsud’s phrase “cultural memory” suggests. If the gift is a gift of 
otherness, a gift of exteriority, is it in any sense similar to human relationships, say 
friendship? Does such an understanding of gift economy help explain interpersonal or 
social responsibilities? As Derrida tries to read Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac to God in 
terms of gift economy, this thesis likewise makes a similar attempt with the biblical 
story of Salomé; As Levinas deploys his discourse on gift economy with his allusion 
to Moses, we are likewise provided with answers to possibility of gift and to the 
above questions concerning other. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Dahn  41
II. The Good Gift 
The Levinasian Gift of Other 
In the discourse of gift economy, it is a common belief that “gifts can have 
negative connotations” (34). So says Hammons reiterating what David Cressy and 
Natalie Zemon Davis believe about gifts. Jeff Massey also believes that “in practical 
terms, even a well-intentioned gift expects reciprocity” (17). He goes so far to give us 
the following amusing example: “For example, the presentation ‘Happy birthday!’” 
according to Massey, “is always followed by a silent ‘Now you owe me one.’ Exactly 
what the “one” in such an exchange may signify has been the subject of much 
subsequent gift criticism, as have been other issues…” (ibid). While this insistence on 
the gift as the bad gift shall come back under discussion in even more details, it is 
only here to contrast the very different take of Levinas on the gift. For Levinas, the 
gift may be a good gift. 
A look at the gift through a Levinasian view can immediately bring out the main 
concern for Levinas’ understanding of gift economy—it all comes down to other. It is 
a leverage with “I” at one end and “other” at the other. Gift-giving is an act conducted 
between the two; the gift is the corollary product of such an act. Through the act of 
giving and the object of gift, the giver comes to the recipient and the recipient comes 
into the knowledge of the giver. Gift economy links these two ends and ushers other 
into our world and therefore knowledge, and it is thus similar to Mauss’ idea that the 
gift contributes to the forming of social structure and interpersonal relationships. Yet, 
Levinas’ similar idea comes with a dissimilar attitude towards the interaction in the 
relationships. 
For Levinas, the relationships the gift helps to build come into effect through 
responsibilities; responsibilities come from other. Other is indispensable in gift 
economy; without other, there can be no gift, no responsibilities, no interpersonal Dahn  42
relationships whatsoever. The gift demands the existence and the awareness of other; 
from other, responsibilities evolve and lend themselves to the stabilization of our 
society and life. The gift, following Levinas’ reasoning, is a good gift. As summarized 
by Attridge, other and responsibilities are two sides of a coin, inextricably 
indispensable in all social relationships: 
Without responsibility for the other…there would be no other; without the 
other,…there would be no same, no self, no society, no morality. We cannot 
deduce the obligation to the other from the world; the world…is premised 
on an obligation to the other. (28) 
Here the logic follows that other triggers responsibility and responsibility is traceable 
back to obligation, a focus of Maussian study of gift economy. It therefore shows 
again the similarity (in that the Levinasian responsibility equals to the Maussian 
obligation) and dissimilarity (in that the Levinasian gift is good but the Maussian gift 
is bad) between Mauss and Levinas. 
In Derek Attridge’s reading of Levinas, ethics to other is prior to everything 
(ibid); in Ken Jackson’s reading of Levinas, obligation precedes everything. In his 
elaboration on “pure obligation toward other,” Jackson asserts that such obligation is 
“not grounded in any economy of exchange but grounded on itself alone: a religion 
without religion. The obligation to the other precedes everything else” (65). One may 
pose a question here, merely for the sake of logic: If Attridge’s ethics or Jackson’s 
obligation here is the very premise of everything from which human relationships 
develop and gift economy comes clear, what does other count for? Isn’t other, whom 
ethics or obligation serves and makes sense to, the primal cause for the working of 
them? Logically speaking, it is other that precedes everything in the Levinasian view. 
Not anything else, in the beginning was the other. It is other that calls forth the gift. 
The gift is thus made possible and such a gift possibility relies completely on the Dahn  43
premise of other. 
In the gift reading of the biblical story of Salomé, the concept of the other and 
the concept of birth as the gift is of essential importance. These two concepts are to be 
understood first before the gift reading of the story picks up its pace and goes any 
further. These concepts especially explain the relationship and obligation between 
Herodias and her daughter Salomé. While a good and possible gift is inducible from 
Levinas, other scholars contribute their efforts to the discourse and think that the gift 
goes beyond the discussion of possibility and its giving has always been in practice in 
its feminine form—an opinion prevalently shared between Cixous and other 
scholars.
13  The logic of this chapter proceeds the following discussion in the order of 
examining the good gift, the feminine gift, and the ultimate gift—birth with its 
relationship to the ultimate other—the child. 
For Derrida, the gift is not merely impossible but also a statement of the 
impossible.
14  From the moment the statement is made by him, the gift has been 
labeled as an equivalent to impossibility if not a myth. Few dares to argue otherwise. 
Iris Marion Young and Marguerite La Caze are two among the few. While Levinas 
deploys his discourse focused on the indispensable nature of other and recognizes the 
existence of other makes possible the gift, the two scholars under discussion directly 
point out the possibility. 
For Young, the gift economy operates in a way similar to that in which human 
communication functions. This gift is not to be taken as a “mere exchange” and the 
gift exceeds the logic of exchange and “creates reciprocal ties between people and a 
pure gift is possible” (La Caze 124). In the description of gift-giving by Young, the 
                                                 
13  Mainly in her “The Laugh of Medusa” in Signs 1 (4): 875-893 and “Sorties” anthologized in The 
Logic of the Gift. 
14  This famous quote of Derrida is ubiquitously recurrent in books on and by him. The direct source of 
the quote usually refers to his Given Time, from the beginning few pages right off, especially in page 
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giving and the receiving along with the idea of reciprocation are all included and do 
not bear a striking difference in the way they are conducted in comparison with the 
way they are in Mauss’ description. What really distinguishes them from each other is 
their aftereffect in focus. 
According to Mauss, what haunts the gift and drives it along is hau. Obviously, 
the Maussian gift is haunted by a kind of evil hau, an evil spirit of the gift, that wails 
along its way and seeks the next victim in the circle of gifting. Young’s gift, no less 
autonomous than the Maussian gift, seems to hold in it a benign spirit that only aims 
to befriend others: 
[G]ift-giving is basic to the generation of normative structures in most 
societies, precisely because it establishes relations of reciprocity: I give a 
gift to you, and you give a gift to me, or the opening is made for you to give 
a gift to me.” (Young 54) 
According to Young, the logic of the gift is simple and the nature of the gift is 
benevolent. In the description of the working of the gift, the sense of indebtedness is 
absent. It helps to build a two-way relationship to mutual benefits. As I help you, you 
help me. There is not any demand or claim of favor in sight. This understanding of 
gift-giving is not achieved through ignorance to what may lies beyond the interactions 
between the two parties. It results from the point of view that each gift-giving finishes 
its course when the gift is first given and then reaches the state of being accepted. No 
more. It is completely different from what Mauss, Derrida, and the majority of the gift 
theorists believe. It is not an endless vicious circle. “Rather,” according to Young, “we 
give a gift or present and it is simply accepted. If later the other gives me a gift, then 
that is the beginning of a new asymmetrical relation” (125). 
For a Mauss-molded or Derrida-ridden reader, this appears way to simplified and 
naïve. Yet, a close look may help to reveal what seems less impeccable on both sides. Dahn  45
The mainstream idea of gift-giving, focusing on the fact that “I give you something; 
now you owe me one,” takes it as an endless vicious circle. The consideration of 
“now we get even” is completely ignored. On the other hand, Young’s idea that gifting 
ends in a linear round from the act of giving to the act of receiving though may appear 
far more simple in comparison to the former, it does provide us with another take on 
gift economy. This view of Young is especially pertinent to the understanding of the 
gift of birth as a good gift. This point shall be examined in further details later. 
In explaining Young’s gift, La Caze also agrees on the possibility and benign 
nature of the gift. She is not at all ambiguous on her assumption: “my view is that a 
pure gift that is exchanged is…possible” (125).
15  She shares her view on how 
Young’s account of the gift is an improvement on Derrida’s. According to La Caze, 
the major improvement lies in Young’s understanding of the gift from the previous 
recipient does not constitute a return, but a new and genuine gift (ibid).
16 
Young’s original idea that the gift from the previous recipient counts for a new 
and genuine gift and La Caze’s agreement on it prove that the two scholars belong in 
the Levinasian school. In a Maussian reading or Derridian reading, the giver starts the 
giving and the gift eventually yearns to come back to the giver, or at least the hau in 
the giving yearns so. It never takes other into consideration. Everything starts from an 
“I,” the giving subject, the center Ego which all gifts and recipients surround and thus 
                                                 
15  The reason why in her statement the word “exchanged” is employed is that earlier in her discussion, 
La Caze makes the distinction between “the spontaneous gift (her original wording)” and the 
occasional gift (my emphasis). In her discussion, Young’s gift seems to refer to “the spontaneous 
gift”—a gift given spontaneously at will with no string attached or on a specific occasion. The word 
“exchanged” is included in her talk when she reasons that “the occasional gift”—any gift given and 
usually exchanged on a specific occasion, usually a well-recognized or widely celebrated holiday, 
including gifts for Christmas, birthdays, anniversaries, weddings, housewarmings (See La Caze 125). 
The point she tries to make is that all kinds of gifts claim their possibility, spontaneous or not. Her 
categorization of gifts in two is simply a supplementation to Young’s in order to furnish such a 
categorization to its thoroughness. 
16  Also emphasized by Young is that “the interval or gap in time between gift, which also means that 
each gift is given as something new and is the beginning rather than the end of something” (ibid). 
However, no explanation is provided on how the interval can serve as a device to activate a new giving 
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make sense. It is all about “I.” Other is a complete absence. Whoever starts the giving 
will always be the giver and all other givings and gifts answer to the primal giving. If 
such a logic stands, the possibility of genuine giving and giver is nullified, let alone 
the gift. Maybe this fits perfectly to explain why in the biblical story of Abraham, 
Derrida finds God to be the only enactment of gift-giving. He alone, as the ultimate 
male authority, is entitled to give. This banishment of other in the Derridian reading of 
gift economy marks a sharp contrast to that of Levinas’ which takes other for the 
beginning of all possibilities. 
Without this Leviansian reasoning, the right to give cannot be assumed by any 
other agent than God. Any mortals, including all mothers, cannot be true givers on 
this philosophical premise. Only when Young’s linear round of gift-giving is applied, 
can a new giver arise. Such a round hands down the right to a genuine gift, and 
enables gift-giving to work one round after another, not endlessly in the same circle. 
Only when the gift circle starts afresh can a mother assumes the role of a true giver 
and by so doing assumes her responsibilities to other—her child. 
In this manner, the roles we assume in gift economy are floating and flexible. 
The subject and the other are closely drawn to each other and may or may not choose 
to shift their roles in a new round. In this role shift, interpersonal relationships are 
made possible. No one is destined to act as a giver; no one is destined to passively 
receive and return. There is no hau to cause any “gift anxiety” that irks both the giver 
and the recipient. There is the benign floating other. When you give in your round to 
me, I am the other; when I give in a new round, you are the other. The role-shift 
endows us with the awareness of the other; the gift-giving promises all such an 
experience. With such an understanding, a mother is to her child a true giver; without, 
a child can only be born under the shadow of the capitalized Father. 
It is extremely crucial here to make clear that the concept of other, recognized by Dahn  47
this thesis as absent in the Derridian gift-giving, is not to be confused with a different 
concept of other mentioned in The Gift of Death. These two are of completely 
dissimilar natures. In the context of the present discussion, the Levinasian other is a 
temporarily passive recipient of the gift, with the opportunity and ability in the future 
to act as a giving subject onto a new recipient, namely another new other. It is a 
floating identity that lasts for only one round of gift-giving. The Derridian other, 
especially the one in his discussion of Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac to God, refers 
directly to God. This other is never passive. The reason why Derrida equates God 
with other, though disputably, may be that such a dialectical design facilitates his 
statement that God is the tout autre, the total other. The reason for this design is that 
Derrida is aware of the need to make Abraham’s gift to God a true gift that is unable 
to demand anything back and therefore unable to develop into any further 
complication of reciprocation. On this premise, the recipient of such a gift must be 
some entity or being beyond the reach of human knowledge in the hope that the gift 
may not be requited. This tout autre is other in the sense that it is completely 
unknown and incomprehensible to human beings so that the gift-giving circle may 
come to a full stop. The Derridian other is the Almighty, an extremely powerful other, 
who denies the knowledge of himself to mere mortals, let alone lends itself to any role 
shift. Ken Jackson once explains the Derridian other’s function in gift economy: “The 
gift—the impossible—is linked to Derrida’s religious explorations in that the tout 
autre, the wholly other, the God which cannot be know, must occupy the same 
aneconomic—impossible—space as the gift” (40). This view goes in parallel with the 
point made here. 
Before we resume our previous discussion of the story of Salomé to focus on the 
link of gift economy between Herodias and Salomé, it is to be noteworthy that the 
birth giving by Herodias to Salomé as a gift is definitely benign by itself. The birth Dahn  48
giving, as nothing short of a gift of all mother-givers to the children-others, is 
universally good. It is the later demand of Herodias on her claim of a request to kill 
that makes the gift of birth an evil binding investment instead of a “primary ethical 
gift of generosity” that welcomes an other to the world (Ziarek 225). Therefore, the 
nature of birth and the nature of Herodias’ employment of birth should be dealt with 
separately. 
Down to the basics, Herodias is mother to Salomé. Salomé must obey Herodias. 
This goes without saying. There is no denial, but there is no dialectic either. The issue 
of birth in light of gift economy between the mother and the child should be based on 
theoretical reasoning rather than on biological fact. The logic behind this is far more 
complicated than mere blood relation as expounded by one of the most influential 
scholars on the issue of birth as a topic of gift studies: 
To be given in birth is already to receive the imperative to bear or support 
an Other who may or may not be my child. I bear the Other “like a maternal 
body” not because I am the cause of the Other’s existence, but precisely 
insofar as I am not her cause...To become like a maternal body for the Other 
is to bear responsibility for her as if she were my child… if responsibility 
for an Other means bearing the stranger like a maternal body, then maternity 
must signify more than a genetic, biological relation to “my own” flesh and 
blood. Already, maternity points to an encounter with an Other who is both 
intimate and strange, both utterly close and inexorably distant. (Guenther, 
The Gift of Other 11)
17 
The above quoted statement is put forth by Lisa Guenther, influenced by Levinas 
                                                 
17  The Gift of the Other: Levinas and the Politics of Reproduction is so far the most noted among Lisa 
Guenther’s publications. A major part of this book is dedicated to her renowned scholarship in the field 
of birth in gift economy. The quote here is taken from “Birth, Time, and Ethics.” For a thorough survey 
of her scholarship in this field, please refer to Chpaters 3,5, 6. For a ready gist of the book, one may 
refer to the review by Ewa Plonowska Ziarek in Hypatia, vol. 23, No.4, Fall 2008. 225-228. Dahn  49
among other thinkers on birth as a gift issue. The child who receives the gift of birth is 
referred to as “an Other,” a Levinasian recipient other. The gift of birth is markedly 
not an investment of down payment for future request. The mother is mentioned in the 
imperative. She is a can-not-but arrangement for the gift-giving. She does not and will 
not own the child or hold it back to herself in any way. The Levinasian alienation 
between the birth-giver and the to-be-born child is conspicuous. The ever-sounding 
subjunctive mood amounted to by recurrent “if”s and “as if”s (there are more in 
omission) and other similar wordings tells of the contention that birth is the ultimate, 
unbinding gift for other, pour autre, i.e., a gift of altruism. It is “an encounter with 
Other” and it signifies “more than a genetic or biological relation. The common 
misunderstanding that the child is part of the mother is utterly subverted here. Once 
the act of giving is finished, other is no longer other. It may immediately starts a new 
round of giving in which the new mother, now as an other, comes to know the new 
life of subjectivity in this given encounter. What we take for granted—both the blood 
relation and the sense of belonging between the mother and the child—does not help 
elucidate birth as exhaustively and as enlighteningly. To sum up in Guenther’s words, 
birth is “a welcome, a gift, a renewal of time,” and paradoxically “a fortunate 
dispossession” (The Gift of the Other 163). 
This dispossession is not to be questioned by the custody the law allows the 
parents. This dispossession, as formerly explained, refers to the fact that the 
to-be-born child assumes the role of other only temporarily and once the process of 
birth is finished, the round of giving is done. The child then is done with its role as an 
other. The mother who gives birth to the child may soon becomes a recipient as a new 
other in the new round of giving in which the child becomes the giver. In addition, the 
child, though inside the body of the mother, is never really possessed by the mother. Dahn  50
Neither does the mother know whom she is giving birth to. It is, following Levinas
18 
and Guenther, a birth given to an other, a total stranger. It is therefore all in all a 
genuine dispossession and a genuine gift of generosity. The gift of birth makes no 
choice to either the giver or the recipient. The concept of dispossession is essential in 
Levinas’ discussion of birth and the other. 
Both Levinas and Derrida resort to other for their discourses. Derrida simply 
makes his discourse and reasoning inapplicable to “others.” Derrida claims God to be 
his other to stop the gifting circle and at the same time to stop all other references. On 
the issue of gift of birth, his makes for his own God and the one and only other. On 
the other hand, Levinas not only makes his other a more convincing, applicable other, 
but also refers it to motherhood and gift of birth itself from time to time. His other is 
“true” other. It does not rely solely on the unknown quality to be an other. It receives 
the gift of birth. It is the unknown within the known, not an ever-lasting brainier 
fending off human access. It is a stranger, but in flesh. 
This idea of dispossession is taken to its extremes by Levinas. While Guenther 
mildly elaborates on Levinas by saying that “to become like a maternal body for 
someone is to bear responsibility for anther as if she were my child, as if I gestated 
and bore in my flesh even the stranger” (“Like A Maternal Body” 120), Levinas 
actually uses “as if” and other negative wordings on the physical conception of the 
baby; it is a total denial of possession to free the gift onto the other: 
In proximity, the absolutely Other, the stranger whom “I have neither 
conceived nor given birth to,” I have already on my arms, already I bear 
him, according to the Biblical formula, “in my breast as the wet-nurse bears 
the nursling” (Numbers XI, 12). He has no other place, not autochthonous, 
                                                 
18 Refers  to  Otherwise Than Being, or Beyond Essence, in which Levinas explains how the to-be-born 
child is an other and a stranger. See page 91. Dahn  51
without roots, without a fatherland […]: this is the homelessness or 
strangeness […]. It falls upon me, makes me incumbent. (91)
19 
It speaks of the floating state of the other, its state of being not “autochthonous,” 
rootless, and on exile. It also speaks of the otherness of the child to the mother, but the 
phrase “I have neither conceived nor given birth to” is not to be taken for what 
Levians really means other than a biblical metaphor he finds fit. The choice of this 
biblical quotation can be understood as an emphasis of the idea of dispossession 
between the mother and the child. The point is to make clear that the gift of birth a 
gift involving Levinasian responsibilities, which are bound for a stranger and which 
almost (my emphasis) precedes everything.
20 
The child, the stranger of dispossession, can be further understood in the 
following reasoning. The act of giving must be completed for the gift to come to its 
presentation to the other. The giving is finished only when the child is born. It is a gift 
of the abstract concept of birth and of the physical body of a newborn. The 
presentation of the gift, namely the birth, is finished when the body comes out of the 
giver. The gift of birth is given at the moment when the unknown other within 
                                                 
19  In the available existing versions of the Bible, the line quoted from Numbers 11:12 is an 
interrogation, not a firm negative statement. For example, in the King James Version (1611), it reads as 
“Haue I conceiued all this people? haue I begotten them, that thou shouldest say vnto me, Cary them in 
thy bosome (as a nursing father beareth the sucking child) vnto the land which thou swarest vnto their 
fathers?” The interrogative mood is consistent in most versions and in the English versions the word 
“begot” is often used instead of “give birth to.” Biblical versions consulted here include: (English) 
American Standard Version, Bishops' Bible (1568), Geneva Bible (1587), Darby Bible (1889), 
Douay-Rheims Bible (1899), Jewish Publication Society Bible, KJV with Strong's Numbers, KJV (1611), 
KJV with Apocrypha, KJV (red letter), New International Version, Young's Literal Translation (1898) 
and (other langauges) Dutch Staten Vertaling, French Crampon, French Darby Bible, French Louis 
Segond, German Elberfelder Bible, German Luther Bible, German Schlachter Bible, Chinese Union 
Version (traditional), Hungarian Kairali Bible, Japanese Shinkaiyaku Bible, Vulgata Clementina, 
Stuttgart Vulgate, New Vulgate. In all of the authoritative versions listed above, none translates the 
biblical text into a negative statement. My point is that Levinas may find this slight modification (or he 
quotes a very rare Hebrew script with striking discrepancy) better serves his point, but the interrogative 
mood sets a wondering tone between confusion and a rhetorical question. This interrogative mood may 
better reflect the confused mind of a non-dominant giver. 
20  Levinas’ adaptation of the biblical text to the issue of birth is often criticized by feminist scholars 
that it tends to disrupt a true understanding of maternality or the maternal body, for the wet nurse image 
is assumed by a male, Moses. Nevertheless, the image he assumed here is neither confusing nor 
misleading in our understanding of the mother/giver’s position in gift-giving.   Dahn  52
becomes the unknown other without. It is a gift of total bereavement. Part of the 
giver’s body is rendered out of herself to form a not-knowing and not-known entity. 
The stranger is strange in every sense of the word. The birth recipient is strange to the 
birth giver as the giver is to the recipient. The dispossession stands both literally and 
figuratively. 
It is this stranger that encourages La Caze to say “gifts can also be given 
thoughtlessly, without acknowledging…the other” (126). There surely is no way for 
the mother/giver to acknowledge the child/other. Young is also believed to be 
influenced by Levinas and introduce the self-effacing and self-sacrificial elements in 
the mother/giver (ibid). In the Levinasian account, the mother, the birth-giver, is the 
true giver of the true gift. In her Feminist Interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas, Sonia 
Sikka concludes: “Levinas never depicts her [the woman] as one who is owed; she is 
always the one who gives” (109). She is a generous giver and, though Levinas never 
says this point blank, the gift is possible. The gift of birth is possible. 
To sum up, the reason for the lengthy discussion here on the nature of 
birth-giving as a gift, is to indicate that, unlike the gifts mentioned by Mauss and 
other scholars, a positive gift is possible and the ultimate gift is birth. This can come 
to a full realization only through the Levinasian other—the to-be-born child, to whom 
the birth-giver, the mother, renders an undemanding and dispossessing giving. This is 
the reason for the lengthy discussion on other in gift economy. Thus, the nature of 
birth giving as a form of gift-giving can be understood as a bond between Salomé and 
Herodias. This non-possessive, unselfish giving in general is applicable to all 
mother-child relation as an initial premise, including Herodias-Salomé’s. The gift of 
birth is pure and good by nature. It is Herodias’ later demand of reciprocity that makes 
it bad. It is bad seemingly because the demand to kill, but it is indeed bad by the 
Herodis’ embezzlement of the originally benign gift to demand an evil reciprocity. It Dahn  53
is not only morally sinful, but it also theoretically makes the pure gift impossible. 
As this chapter is exclusively dedicated to the possibility and good nature of the 
gift, it is necessary to leave the discussion of this gift when it is embezzled and altered 
by nature to serve the need of Herodias. An ensuing discussion in the aspect shall be 
resumed in later chapters. 
The Feminine Gift of Cixous 
For Cixous, the gift issue is a gender issue. According to her, there are two 
separate kinds of gift categories: the masculine gift of debt and the feminine gift of 
generosity. While the former is impossible, the latter is perfectly possible.
21 
Drawing upon her reading of Mauss and Derrida, Cixous coins the term 
“masculine economy” (“Sorties” 151, 154). For her, gift-giving in the masculine 
economy is always associated with debt, while gift-giving in the feminine economy is 
practiced beyond return (ibid). The reason is that there are actually two separate 
spheres for gift-giving. It is operated completely differently in these two spheres. One 
is called by her “the Realm of Proper,” annotated by Iulie Aslaksen as “the masculine 
aspect of motivation” (128); the other is called “the Realm of Gift,” annotated as “the 
feminine aspect of motivation” (ibid). In the Realm of Proper, social activities like 
gift-giving are based on the consideration of properties. Gift-giving is therefore a 
form of investment in future requests from others. The act of giving is the fact of 
saving. All the acts of giving in the realm aim to form an exterior archive of resources 
for later retrieval in the future. Cixous believes, this is operated by a masculine 
monetary fear. The fear is found absent in the other realm (“Sorties” 152). The 
                                                 
21  Here is an interesting peripheral fact: Among all the scholars who advocate the possibility of the gift, 
Levinas happens to be the only male. Surely enough, when Lewis Hyde speaks of the gift of music and 
other forms of gift of art, he must acquiesce in the possibility too. However, a closer look at scholars 
who mention the possibility of the gift may reveal that among Mari Lee Mifsud, Ewa Plonowska 
Ziarek, Lisa Guenther, Marguerite La Caze, Iris Marion Young, Iulie Aslaksen, Elizabeth L’Orange 
Fürst, Emmanuel Levinas, and finally and conditionally (if it is a feminine gift) Hélèn Cixous, he alone 
is a he. This seems to reflect with a smile on Cixous’ division between the feminine economy and the 
masculine economy. Dahn  54
concealed goal of savings and the masculine fear conspire to make the gift impossible 
in the Realm of Proper. 
Gift-giving, however, is practiced differently in the principle of generosity in the 
other feminine realm. In the Realm of Gift, gift-giving does not correspond to 
relations of exchange. Instead, it is motivated by generosity, without demand or 
expectation of reciprocity (ibid). The previously mentioned masculine fear is 
somehow not inscribed to the feminine realm and therefore its absence is corollary. 
If birth-giving is to be placed under this Cixousian categorization of realms, it is 
to be recognized that it is only discussable in the Realm of Gift. As the masculine fear 
is absent in the feminine Realm of Gift, the birth-giving is an exclusive experience to 
the female body. It is an experience absent in the male world. The categorization by 
Cixous may seem arbitrary, yet it is not only empirically but also epistemologically 
reasonable. The possibility of the gift, for Cixous, is not to be discussed in the realm 
of masculine experience with financial concern. 
Cixous focuses on generosity in her discussion; Elisabeth L’Orange Fürst too 
introduces generosity as a motivating force (444); Iulie Aslaksen argues that 
generosity engenders connection between people (128). All three emphasize 
generosity. Generosity seems to be a feminine force or motivation which men are not 
capable of. This also makes sense in that birth-giving is fundamentally something 
men are not capable of. In the discussion of birth-giving as gift-giving, we must admit 
that generosity must be taken as an exclusively feminine quality which is owned by 
the mother and also motivates the mother to be a giver. It is an altruistic quality which 
aims to give birth to autre. 
The fact that Cixous makes birth-giving a gender issue and the other two 
scholars likewise appeal to female experiences makes it extremely difficult to gratify 
the reader with an analytical discussion similar to the previous one of Levinas. Cixous Dahn  55
strategizes with gender exclusion on men with a good reason—they are incapable of 
giving birth. Fürst brings forth the culinary experience of women in kitchen and the 
idea of their gift of food. She later contrasts the food-sharing transaction to men’s 
money-earning transaction for extended understanding of gendered gift-giving 
phenomena. Aslaksen refers to ideal, ease, and self-rewarding good will for her 
recourse. A more detailed passage reads as follows: 
True generosity is an ideal: it is hard to define and perhaps best understood 
through stories […] Motivated by true generosity, giving is in one sense 
effortless, because you feel that you are fortunate to be able to give, and the 
receiver senses this and is not poisoned by the feeling of having to return. 
Generosity can also come out of feeling a sense of connection with others. 
To see someone’s real needs and act according is a true gift. (128) 
The reader is advised to settle down with this understanding rather than expect a rigid 
academic dialect in a conventional male form of reasoning. 
Generosity in this female or feminine discourse is to be taken as a primal cause 
to give, for it exists and its existence is perceived through observations of historical 
and daily facts other than abstract deductions. Cixous expels men out of the realm of 
birth, the realm of the possible gift; Fürst declares men’s absence in and women’s 
right to the kitchen, the place of sharing; Aslasken explains that generosity is hard to 
define, and “to define” seems to be a men’s inclination. All these are based on 
observations of historical facts, while generosity denies a lucid definition. We come to 
realize its indispensability in the gift-giving of birth. 
As Guenther offers her statement on the same issue, “women have long been 
expected to give without expectation of return” and it follows that for women, the gift 
is possible. How is one supposed to deny that when such a statement, though not Dahn  56
phrased in an academic way, is all in all factual in human history?
22 
Hyde’s Gift of Art 
Unlike other scholars dedicated their efforts to the gift theory in comparatively 
abstract human relationships or philosophy, Hyde’s efforts are mainly made to clarify 
the connection between art and the gift and also the connection between creation and 
the gift. It is in this sense that we resort to Hyde for a deeper reading of Salomé’s 
dance as a gift. For he alone speaks of the gift in light of solid artistic creation and 
creativity. 
Hyde’s artistic view on the gift is quite original. The fact that he aims to speak of 
and for artistic creation and the dilemma of artists makes him stand apart from other 
thinkers. He also focuses on the association of the gift as a present and the gift as a 
talent. This contribution to the gift discourse claims credits entirely his own. The main 
grains of thinking can be carved out as follows: the distinction between a gift and a 
commodity, the completion of a work of art and its association of the gift, the 
transforming power of art, the two economies of art, the gift as a transient 
phenomenon, and the most quoted line by Hyde—“the gift must always move” (Hyde 
4).
23 
For Hyde, there is a telling difference between a gift and a commodity. The 
difference lies in the distinction that “a gift is a thing we do not get through our own 
efforts […] we cannot acquire it through an act of will […] is bestowed upon us” and 
                                                 
22  Of course scholars like Guenther is fully capable of the rigid “men’s talk,” as she later affirms that 
“to understand ethics as becoming like a maternal body for the Other is to propose…a vision of 
maternity as the gift of time and incarnation, a gift that carries over the imperative to give to Others” 
(133). 
23  Lewis Hyde is a very exceptional figure in the field of gift theory. Among all the influential scholars, 
he alone is not so much known by an inflexible identity as a theorist or philosopher. His dedication to 
the gift theory by his publication The Gift: Imagination and the Erotic Life of Property (1983) is 
literally “phenomenal.” It is not only impressive as phenomenal but also a mere temporary 
phenomenon in his versatile life as a scholar of humanities and as an active writer. He has been very 
active in other fields of studies, mostly poetry and history. His latest scholarship mainly build on 
studies of Henry David Thoreau. In recent years, he is more active as a writer and translator. Dahn  57
“the sale of a commodity leaves us no necessary connection” (56). This distinction 
leads directly to his discussion of the two economies of art—a market economy and a 
gift economy. Hyde points out: “Works of art exist simultaneously in two economies, 
a market economy and a gift economy” (xi). This view is later furthered into the 
distinction between the eros and logos which deviates from our concern here.
24 
This distinction is very important in our reading of the nature of Salomé’s dance 
to Herod and to Herodias. As we assume two different views on that Herodias gives 
birth to Salomé, we also assume two different views on the dance by Salomé. The 
birth given to Salomé by Herodias is taken apart into two discussions: the universal 
gift of birth by the mother to the child—which has been placed under a lengthy 
discussion, and the later-turned bad gift from Herodias to Salomé as life favor for an 
evil demand—this is left for later discussion in ensuing chapters. Salomé’s dance, 
likewise, is to be taken into two dissimilar considerations: one as a gift, a work of art 
dedicated to Herod; the other as repayment or item of reciprocity, an evil favor to 
return what Salomé owes Herodias. 
As a work of art, under a Hydean discussion, is a gift. It is not completely 
through efforts alone. It is received. It is something partly finished by the artist’s labor 
and partly by a nameless impulse (276). Hyde more often than not refers it to 
invocation and manages to keep this idea as mysterious and ancient as the ancient 
Greeks. The work of art, in Salomé’s case, the dance, is therefore a gift already before 
it is presented to another person by the dancer. In Hyde’s own words, 
[…] gifts that are agents of change, it is only when the gift has worked in us, 
                                                 
24  In Mitzi Myers’ understanding of Hyde, the gift exchange is to be taken as an “erotic commerce,” 
“opposing eros to logos.” By eros she means the principle of attraction and involvement, a binding 
principle or force; a principle or force found decisive in gift exchange. By logos, she means reason, 
logic and differentiation; a principle or strategy characterizing the market economy, for the act of 
paying for something buys off any further attachment. Buying buys off social relationships. While the 
discussion of this thesis is confined within the story of Salomé as it is in the existent Bible, the 
association of the “erotic commerce” and Oscar Wilde’ Salomé can surely be of some discourse 
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only when we have come up to its level…that we can give it away 
again…the end of the labor of gratitude is similarity with the gift or with its 
donor. (xi) 
In this quote, Hyde points out the possibility of three gifts: the work of art as a gift to 
the artist on its completion; the work of art as a gift from the artist as a donor to other; 
the fact that the giver of the gift who works gratitude along with labor into the work 
makes a third gift in the giving—the semi-giver-semi-gift combination. 
Coincidentally, Hyde also speaks of the transforming power of art. Hyde speaks 
of art creation as a vocation dependent on invocation. He understands the process of 
artistic creation as: “most artists are converted to art by art itself” (47). This is 
especially true and necessary in the case of a dancer. As we already discussed in the 
previous chapter how Salomé as the giver of the dance dedicated to Herod can be part 
of the gift by assimilating her body into the gift, this view on the dance makes even 
more sense under Hyde’s understanding of artistic creation. In the art of dancing, 
Salomé is to be converted to the art of dance. Another point of view is that, the fact 
that Salomé has to present the dance herself to (and so has to present no one else or 
nothing else but herself to) Herod makes it a genuine gift of art in Hyde’s gift 
economy. It is not something available on the market. It is not something buyable. 
Though quite recurrent in Hyde’s discussion as well as in others’ discussion on 
Hyde, the phrase “gifts must always move” refers more to the influences between 
artists through generations than an applicable reasoning for other considerations. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting how in different contexts theorists come up with 
strikingly similar observations for their own uses. Hyde maintains “gifts must always 
move” in the context stated above; Natalie Zemon Davis explains to us the old 
continental view that “everything we have is a gift of God, and what comes in as a gift 
has some claim to go out as a gift” (11); and in the very beginning of the thesis, there Dahn  59
are Mauss and his hau, which drives the giver, the giving, and the gift along. Mauss 
has his hau; Davis has her God; Hyde, his art. 
The brand new take on the definition or nature of the gift by Hyde is its state of 
being transient. For Hyde, the gift of art can at some point as ephemeral as music. The 
gift does not last. It is characterized by its volatile nature. Hyde dedicates lengthy 
discussion to the transience of the gift, mostly in terms of music. The similarity 
between physical performance and vocal performance in regard to their transient 
nature is strikingly interchangeable and Rob C. Wegman’s interpretation of a Hydean 
observation of music is reasonably applicable to our understanding of Salomé’s dance. 
According to Hyde, “the gift is property that perishes” and he bases this 
statement on his idea of “consumption.” He explains this idea alongside the difference 
between gift and market: 
…the gift perishes for the person who gives it away. In gift exchange the 
transaction itself consumes the object…a gift is consumed when it moves 
from one hand to another with no assurance of anything in return. There is 
little difference, therefore, between its consumption and its movement. A 
market exchange has an equilibrium or stasis: you pay to balance the scale. 
But when you give a gift there is momentum, and the weight shifts from 
body to body. (9) 
This momentum, coinciding with the idea of Hyde’s most famous quote—“gifts must 
always move”—tells us of the consuming nature of the move, and later leads to 
Hyde’s focus on the transience of the gift. In Hyde’s point of view, the gift is to be 
consumed and meant to be consumed—on behalf of the giver. The contrast between a 
gift and a commodity from the market is to bring out the idea that in both, there is 
something to come to a certain use. To be used is to be consumed. A gift as well as a 
commodity can certainly in its own sense come to use, practically or theoretically. Dahn  60
This use is the premise of consumption. It stands before further reasoning. 
In the market economy, the consumption is found two-way: the buyer assumes 
the loss of money; the provider assumes the loss of a product. In gift-giving, the 
demand of a counter-loss on the recipient is missing. The consumption is a one-way 
phenomenon, for Hyde’s gift is a true gift that encourages a return sometimes but 
surely does not guarantee any. From the above quote, we know that in the logic of the 
Hydean gift, the return of a gift is only an option, among a myriad of many other 
means to maintain social relationships. 
If the Hydean gift is a genuine gift of generosity that aims to do good to the 
recipient of it, the good, useful quality of the gift must be consumed so as to do good. 
In the logic of the market exchange, a thing of use is obtained through the money 
spent. Money being spent is not only a concept but a visible phenomenon. The market 
activity is therefore more visible than the gift economy, simply because of its money 
flow. Hence, it is very important to bring out the concept of the consumption of the 
gift in light of the generosity the gift is meant for. 
In Hyde’s later theorization of the consumption of the gift, he brings it far 
enough to deal with the ephemerality of certain art forms. Among them, Rob C. 
Wegman finds music the most exemplar to speak for Hyde’s theory. The good nature 
of the gift that comes to use or does good to the recipient is therefore closely knitted 
with the idea of transience in the gift. If a gift is given in order to be consumed, a gift 
of art must be of the most consumed, namely the most transient gift among gifts.
25 
Resorting to the medieval view of the world, Wegman places music under 
examination for an example of the transient gift of art in light of Hyde’s idea. 
Wegman shares his point that music as an art form is among the unpreservable. So is 
                                                 
25  According to Wegman, the gift economy denies possessions and despises accumulation. “In a gift 
society the principle that property must perish, that you cannot hold on to it indefinitely, is not so much 
regretted…but actively celebrated and used to advantage…by giving away” (434). Dahn  61
dancing. Here we are not to engage ourselves in a proper debate about how modern 
technology helps us perverse the recordings of two-dimensional replica of the original 
performance art meant for one time and one place or how it does not. For a medieval 
reader of St. Isidore, he is denied the opportunity to confuse the factual happening 
with virtual reality. 
“Soni pereunt,” as St. Isidore writes, “sound perishes.”
26  This is a widely quoted 
line in the Middle Ages (Wegman 434). This idea is that the uniqueness of an acoustic 
performance is meant for one time and one more performance does not make it a 
second same. Antonin Artaud has a fairly good point on this observation when he 
speaks of theatrical performances without verbal expression (in this, Artaud’s idea of 
stage performance is also identical with dance) and points they are bound for 
“inventing a language of gesture to be developed in space, a language without 
meaning except in the circumstances of the stage” (61). The ephemerality mentioned 
about music is akin to that about dance. For though we can not be sure if Salomé’s is 
performed to the accompaniment of music, the physical performance of dance is in 
itself ephemeral. While Wegman shares with us the common sense that “we can not 
hold on to them” (434),
27  we are also aware that we can not hold on to dance because 
of its similar transient nature to music. 
The similarity between and the integration of dance and music is thus mentioned 
by Artaud in his The Theatre and Its Double: “…all these sounds are linked to 
movements, as if they were the natural consummation of gestures which have the same 
musical quality” (59). When it comes to the stage performance the relation between 
the physical presentation of the body and the acoustic presentation of instrument is 
inextricable. One is found meaning in the other as they produce the synergistic effect 
                                                 
26  Recorded by Daniel Devoto in Recerca Musicològica iv. 5-17. 
27  In the original Latin quote, music is in its plural form “soni” instead of its singular form “sonus.” 
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to complete each other. Even if taken apart, for one may concern himself to the 
possibility of a dance presented without such a musical accompaniment, the dance is 
not in any sense reduced its similarity of transience to music. 
Another reason why we resort to Artaud for the transience in dance is that his 
opinion of the completion of stage performance is of striking similarity to Hyde’s idea 
of the completion of a work of art. Artaud believes that for a stage performance to 
come to a full shape, the presenter is part of it as the audience is, “because a gesture 
carries its energy with it, and there are still human beings in the theater to manifest 
the force of the gesture made” (81). It is in all senses Hyde’s idea of the gift of art. It 
is the giving of force from one person to another. It is a gift on the move and to be 
appreciated and consumed. Artaud goes even further to say, “there will be a 
preponderant physical share which could not be captured and written down” (111).   
With the endorsement of Artaud, one may feel completely safe in likening it to music 
in terms of their mutual transient nature of a true gift of art. 
Dance, including Salomé’s, is in both Hyde’s and Artaud’s opinions a true art 
form that denies endurance. It is a transient gift of art. It is to be presented to and 
consumed by its audience at the same time. The moment it is received, the energy 
invested in it is consumed. The similarity shared between music and dance, among a 
great deal of others, explains to us why it is no surprise that in the late Latin the word 
“ballare” integrates both senses of “saltare (to dance)” and “cantare (to sing; to play 
music).” The similarity is not only psychologically but also linguistically agreed 
upon. 
The transient nature of art is taken even higher a level by Adam of Fulda, another 
Medieval figure. In his writing in the 1490’s, he mentions such a quality in art. In his 
writing, he shares his opinion that this volatile, instable state of existence in art does 
not stop art like music or dance from being a priceless enjoyment; rather, it elevates Dahn  63
art to a status of philosophy: it is a meditation on death (qtd. Wegman 435).
28 By  that, 
in my understanding, he means that the awareness of the dying beauty of transient gift 
of art, like music or dance, makes it even more valuable as a once-and-for-all art 
form.
29  From the beginning of the birth of a dance, its death begins. It is prepared, 
given, dying at exactly the same time. The dance is always presented in a dying state 
and irrevocable. 
In the same manner and logic, Salomé’s dance is a presentation of a dying and 
irrevocable gift. It is a gift that denies replication and therefore reciprocity—i.e., a 
genuine Hydean gift. This transient quality of the dance comes back again to support 
the recognition in our early discussion that Salomé’s dance is a true gift. The 
endurance or the life of the dance is constructed by Salomé and consumed by Herod 
along with others at the same moment. Salomé’s dance, through our contact with 
Lewis Hyde, St. Isidore, and Adam of Fulda, appears more clearly as a possible and 
genuine gift of art. 
Before we proceed any further, it is of crucial importance to review the good gift 
to contrast the following discussion of the bad gift as referred to in this thesis. The 
good gift, as examined in the previous chapter following the thinking of Levinas, 
Cixous, and Hyde, is by definition a possible, benign, and generous dedication that 
demands or entails no reciprocity of equal value or otherwise. It can also be of help to 
keep in mind the particular distinction drawn by Hyde between a gift and a 
                                                 
28  The access to this antique book is denied due to various impediments. According to Wegman, it is 
taken from Scriptores Ecclesiastici de Musica Sacra Potissimum edited by Martin Gerbert, published in 
1784. The section mentioned in this thesis is recorded in Page 335, Volume Three. 
29  One may be immediately reminded of the opposite—the famous complaint about music by 
Leonardo da Vinci that unlike painting, music dies the moment it is born: “Music has two ills, the one 
mortal, the other wasting; the mortal is ever allied with the instant which follows that of the music’s 
utterance, the wasting lies in its repetition, making it contemptible and mean” (MacCurdy 401). Yet 
hardly questioned is the contradictory nature of the complaint. While the first complaint is targeting to 
attack performance like music on its transience, the second is on its recurrence. Amusing though it may 
serve as an anecdote to one of the great figures of Italian Renaissance, such a complaint does not stand 
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commodity by pointing out that “a commodity has value and a gift does not. A gift has 
worth” (60). By this statement, Hyde tries to explain the common feeling shared 
among people that a gift is one of those things we prize and yet feel different already 
from an identical item on shelf the moment it is handed over from a friend’s hand. It is 
therefore something we prize and yet cannot put a price on. 
For Levinas, the gift is a proof to the premise of other and our responsibilities to 
other. On this premise, all societies and cultures take form. Levinas’ gift-giver takes 
on the figure of a nurturing father like Moses. His idea that the responsibilities to 
other precede everything else foregrounds other as the primal cause to make all things 
possible in human relationships. To Levinas, the gift is already a solid phenomenon 
that explains other and phenomena centered around other. Its possibility and altruistic 
good nature transcend questioning. With the recognition of the gift being the good 
instead of the impossible, we may move on to explore more aspects of the gift 
discourse in the story of Salomé without confining it within the sole discussion of the 
impossible. 
The Cixousian gift of birth given by an undemanding mother to a stranger 
furthers Levians’ point and facilitate our examination of the Herodias-Salomé relation 
and relationship and therefore provides us with an analysis concerning this mother 
and this daughter as well as all mothers and daughters. In the logic of Cixous, the 
birth or blood relation issue between Herodias and Salomé is to be bisected into two 
parts for thorough scrutinizing. All births given by mothers to their children are by 
nature an unselfish gift to the unknown other. This gift of birth is so composed of 
responsibilities to a strange other. Suggested by Cixous, the gift is found impossible 
only in the masculine economy operated by the fear of monetary loss. 
Hyde’s suggestion that the gift of art is a gift of transience and a genuine gift 
contributes to an aesthetic yet irrefutable point of view on the gift. If the possibility of Dahn  65
the gift is to be ruled out, one rules out the possibility of art. Building on his basis of 
the gift of art, he refers to other aspects in humanities as well as in human 
relationships. The possibility of the gift is consistent in all of the three thinkers. Other 
scholars, Reuben Sanchez and Ronald A. Sharp for example, also second and share 
such a view. Hyde’s view of the gift of art helps along the discussion of Salomé’s 
dance as a genuine gift.   
These two scholars make significant contributions following Hyde’s footsteps. 
Sharp emphasizes the connection between the gift and friendship and suggests 
“gift-giving as a metaphor for friendship” (86). According to Sharp, although the 
balance of giving and reciprocation between friends helps the relationship, “the 
concern with balance cannot intrude itself into the foreground of the friendship 
without spoiling it.” That is to say, friendship makes the gift possible, not the other 
way around. Sanchez makes an conclusion to agree on this view: “we tend to think of 
the friendship itself as the structure in which the exchange occurs rather than the 
object of the exchange” (62). These two scholars are left undiscussed in the previous 
passages for their similarity and fast-followed academic characteristics to Hyde, but 
their opinions are brought out here to better explain the Hydean gift. The possibility 
of the gift is never an issue of the Hydean gift. The gift is a product of human 
relationship and human creation. Hyde and Levinas do not find themselves in the 
masculine economy of fear. 
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III. The Bad Gift 
Bourdieu’s Gift of Violence 
For Bourdieu, the gift is a “symbolic, gentle violence” (recurrent in his Selection). 
In any economy, according to Bourdieu, two forms of violence function side by side 
or in turn to build human relationships of dominance (for him, this is how 
relationships are formed)—the overt violence and the symbolic violence. When resort 
to the overt violence is impossible, the second comes to serve the purpose instead 
(223). The gift is a choice of violence; gift-giving is a choice over the “overt 
violence” of the less noticeable, more deceptive— 
symbolic violence, gentle, invisible violence, unrecognized as such, chosen 
as much as undergone, that of trust, obligation, personal loyalty, hospitality, 
gifts, debts, piety, in a word, of all the virtues honored by the ethic of honor, 
presents itself as the most economical mode of domination because it best 
corresponds to the economy of the system. (The Selection 218) 
From Bourdieu’s point of view, the gift exists and it functions in violence. The covert 
nature of such violence makes it a perfect fraud. 
In the names of “trust,” “obligation,” “loyalty,” “hospitality”—all the good 
words associated with virtues—violence is practiced. The gift exerts violence and 
claims its legitimacy and legality. It may well be said that between the two forms of 
violence, the symbolic violence of gift prevails in its disguise. This is an opinion 
shared among theorists like Pierre Bourdieu, Jacques Derrida, and sometimes Luce 
Irigaray (as in “Women on the Market” in The Logic of the Gift 174–89.). Julie 
McGonegal sums up her observation and remarks that “these theorists examine the 
relations of power that render the gift a manipulative gesture in the context of 
capitalist exchange” (293). For Bourdieu, the gift that demands reciprocation connotes 
obligation; the gift that cannot be reciprocated becomes a lasting obligation Dahn  67
(McGonegal 293). The gift is always understood by Bourdieun as a violent imposition. 
Its nature is violent; the way it is imposed upon people is violent. 
Following the logic specified in the preceding paragraph, the practice of violence 
by the gift is legitimized by the subterfuge of seemingly moral values. This is what 
Bourdieu refers to as “officialization” (201-203). The gift is given as an imposition 
that demands obligation or guilt for failing to fulfill obligation. The practice of this 
imposition is socially approved or even appreciated as officially recognized virtues or 
honor. While evil traces lurk under every grain of gift-giving, it is something officially 
encouraged. It is, again in Bourdieu’s words, an “invisible” evil (the original 
employment of the “invisible” by Bourdieu is in the phrase “invisible violence” which 
refers to none other than the gift). Violence is practiced in a good cause. 
A terse definition of Bourdieu’s “officialization” is given by McGonegal as 
follows: “a process of generating a set of socially sanctioned representations in order 
to mask the self-interest that informs the ostensibly generous act” (293). It is exactly 
what allows Herodias to claim her right to a gift from her daughter. It is an evil claim 
promised by officialization. As discussed in Cixous’s gift of birth, following Levinas’ 
logic of the total other, birth is a genuine, generous, undemanding gift for the total 
other. When Herodias first gave birth to Salomé, it should be taken as the benevolent 
Cixousian or Levinasian gift as those given by all mothers to their children. When 
Herodias desires something in exchange of the formerly unselfish gift for other, it 
then becomes a Bourdieuian gift of violence. 
The gift is not impossible by itself. In the case of Herodias, the gift of birth she 
gives to her daughter is by nature and by Levinas’ standard a true gift for other. If 
there is no further exploitation of this gift as a favor that calls for a returned favor, 
Bourdieu’s observation of officialization would not come under our discussion. Yet, 
when there is, the gift of birth turns into a Bourdieuian gift of violence right away; Dahn  68
officailization starts to function; the gift, the giver, and the recipient are “inevitably 
and inextricably bound up in relations of dominance” (McGonegal 294). What is evil 
about the Bourdieuian gift is that 1. it overrules the possibility of the originally 
possible gift; 2. its hypocrisy helps its practice of violence in camouflage. As 
Jean-François Fourny points out, the Bourdieuian gift “is not really a gift, even if it is 
presented as one, because one expects a gift in return, and the apparent generosity 
conceals the pursuit of individual interests” (194). 
In terms of the “pursuit of individual interests,” Alsion V. Scott once uses a more 
direct and derisive analogy to describe the false gift observed by Bourdieu. Scott 
simply relates the gift to the loan of money: 
Pierre Bourdieu has reiterated the peculiar position of the gift in relation to 
the marketplace time and again…the distinction between lending money 
and giving gifts on the ground that, while they both seek increase, the latter 
must appear absolutely removed from self-interest in order to appear as a 
gift. (Scott 325) 
Under the analysis of Scott, it comes clear that the Bourdieuian gift-giving is all in all 
an economic activity which involves both giving and taking. It is not a gift. It is a loan 
that is bound to be repaid. If not, it is then a down payment for something ordered for 
the future. A mother’s genuine gift of birth is then turned into an “economic increase” 
of a revenge for the mother.   
At the moment when the gift’s nature is changed, the nature of the relationship 
between the mother and the child may be subject to change accordingly.
30 The 
maintenance of the original relationship between the mother Herodias and the 
daughter Salomé becomes almost impossible. The original relationship between the 
                                                 
30  Needless to say, as long as the gift stands for a gift of birth, the possibility of the gift stands. The 
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mother and the daughter has now turned into a relationship taking place in a 
marketplace. What was believed to be selfish and self-effacing maternal sacrifice now 
looms large in self-interest. The mother figure is disfigured into a loan-shark figure, 
who comes a long way to claim her interests. 
If the biblical story does go on, if Salomé does wake up from her unconditional 
and immoral obedience, if the officialization of Herodias’ scheme is later debunked, 
the false gift and the way it alters the nature of a mother-daughter relationship may 
appear to Salomé. In the end, Salomé might as well say, “I owed you one, but now 
we’re even!” Her dance buys off the indebtedness. It is even naturally predictable and 
not surprising that she may say to her mother: “We’re through” and renounces their 
blood relation. Yet the cursory progress of the story grudges us any further 
development and therefore discussion thereof. Nonetheless, it is of crucial importance 
to distinguish the two separate phases of the gift of birth in the case of Salomé: it is 
first a genuine gift of birth; it then turns into a false gift that demand an evil favor. 
Following a similar reasoning, Chris A. Gregory suggests the necessary 
distinction between a commodity and a gift. For him, they are of diverse nature by 
function: “Commodity exchange establishes objective quantitative relationships 
between the objects transacted, while gift exchange establishes personal qualitative 
relationships between the subjects transacting” (41). The last paragraph demonstrates 
the potential threat to relationships posed by the demanding false gift. The false gift is 
now in Gregory’s reading more of a commodity than of a gift. It does not help 
relationships; it helps transactions. 
In other words, Herodias’ demand of a returned favor from Salomé turn their 
roles of the mother and the daughter into two business partners in a transaction in 
which a life is claimed for another—the life of Salomé for the life of John. The former 
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partner. It is fairly clear that the mother of Salomé has no right to the life of John. It is 
logically misled for Herodias to make such a claim. 
The ill-grounded thought may often be taken for granted that as a mother of 
Salomé, Herodias can therefore make a choice of gift on behalf of Salomé even if it 
turns out to be a choice to serve the mother’s purpose of revenge. Such a thought 
actually takes quite a few levels of ignorance to form. 
For a gift to be a gift, it must be given without a demand attached. What makes a 
gift is not the act of giving, it is more about this undemanding nature of asking for 
nothing in return. Herodias’ motherhood is legitimized on the premise that, like all 
other mothers, Herodias gave birth to Salomé as such a gift. For the gift to remain a 
gift and for Herodias to remain a mother, the gift-giving must end right here and must 
allow no more exchange economy. 
Once a demand is made and is based on this gift, the gift is immediately annulled. 
As the gift is annulled, the unselfish motherhood of Herodias is too annulled. With her 
identity of a mother deprived, she is a mere partner for Salomé in transaction asking 
for something in return. The gift of birth is now a commodity to be paid for. The seller 
of birth asks for a monetary death instead of cash. The imposition of a demand to kill 
falls on the buyer Salomé. She acquires the commodity; she pays. 
The fact that the death of John does not directly constitute any good to Salomé 
leads us to believe that Salomé’s request of John’s death only serves as currency to 
pay off what Salomé acquires from Herodias. It is very clear that the dance-for-a-head 
scenario is a business scenario. The transaction is “commercially reasonable”; it is a 
“fair transaction”; it follows basic economic demand of equivalent exchange—it is a 
life-for-life deal. However, it is everything but a gift. 
A deeper probe into this transaction may help us find it less fair than it seems. A 
gift of birth to give involves no responsibility nor guilt; a returned gift of a life to Dahn  71
claim (an execution of life) does. It not only involves responsibilities and guilt, it also 
has to face moral and legal consequences. The scales are tipped. The imbalance is 
seen. What tips the balance is the weight of violence. In the false gift, Cynthia Klekar 
observes likewise: “Rather than enacting a reciprocal and balanced exchange, 
gift-giving provokes an ongoing negotiation of values” (“Prisoners in Silken Bonds” 
90). In a gift exchange, the exchanged gifts are hardly equal in values.
31 The 
exchange is therefore forced to go on almost incessantly. 
In the case of Salomé and Herodias, the gift is altered into a commodity. For the 
commodity to continue to function like a gift, it must be misrecognized as a gift. A 
genuine gift constitutes no binding force on the recipient in that it entails no 
obligations to return. For Herodias’ birth-giving to Salomé to come into effect in 
order to seek the execution of John, obligations must be called into play. Since a 
genuine gift does not connote obligations, it becomes necessary to misrecognize   
obligations as gifts. This misrecognition is the core of Bourdieu’s understanding of 
the gift. The gift functions upon a total mistake—a misrecognition. 
Bourdieu’s misrecognition is the only means to reconcile the conflicts between 
(genuine) gifts and obligations( from false gifts). According to Schrift, the Bourdieian 
gift exchange between a gift and its countergift is “made possible by the individual 
and collective misrecognition of the social rules that govern the act of reciprocation” 
(13). The major conflicts of gifts and obligations lie in that the former exist on the 
premise of absence of reciprocity while the latter exactly constitutes demands of 
reciprocity. Reciprocity is the major difference between them. 
Yet, when misrecognition begins to function, gifts and obligations are fused 
                                                 
31  Here in the idea and phrase of “gift exchange,” the word “gift” is of course referring to the false gift. 
In our discussion of birth, a true gift must fit the definition of Levinas’ or Cixous’ and becomes a 
self-effacing devotion to the total other (not Derrida’s powerful Almighty other). The word “value” is 
used here in that Hyde makes the distinction between a commodity and a gift. According to Hyde, a 
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together and this is what happens between Herodias and Salomé. This is what makes a 
mother a business partner, and vice versa. 
Herodias’ role of a true gift giver comes from the fact that she gives birth to 
Salomé. Herodias’ right to claim Salomé’s reward to be her gift comes from the 
concept of business transaction. The coexistence of these two contradictories is 
granted by the work of misrecognition. In Schrift’s words, it is both an individual and 
collective phenomenon. It needs to be believed by Salomé that obedience in the 
choice of a reward and the handing over of it to her mother are part of her filial duties 
to keep. It needs to be practiced in a society in which people think parents are to be 
rewarded in any way they want for everything they do for children. 
Misrecognition is responsible for mistaking gifts as transactions obligations. 
Misrecognition is actually responsible for all the “should’s” and “supposed-to’s” in 
human relationships including the mother-daughter relationships between Herodias 
and Salomé. Any demand of reciprocity made between family members fall into the 
category of misrecognition. When a business partner strikes a bad deal, the other 
businessperson may disagree and avoid the deal in order to protect the business 
interest. When a mother strikes a bad deal, it is still a deal. Misrecognition goes a long 
way. This idea of Bourdieu alone, offers us a much clearer view of human 
relationships, especially when they come into the wrong hand. This is why Elvira 
Vilches once explains Bourdieu’s misrecognition as what makes “gifts carry on a 
repertoire of behavior that conforms to symbolic systems with their own rules that can 
be absorbed and endlessly reproduced without the actor even being aware of what he 
or she is doing” (210).   
Under the hypnotic power of misrecognition, a daughter’s obedience can be 
expected unconditionally by the society, and her choice of an opportunity to avenge 
her mother over a choice of something for herself seems reasonable. Even though this Dahn  73
act of avenging her mother is executed at the cost of someone else’s life, the society, 
far from being surprised, shall deem it an understandable deed. 
Under other circumstances than the one in which a daughter is demanded to be 
an executioner on behalf of a mother, the Bourdieuian concept of misrecognition is 
also capable of explaining why false gifts can be employed in the construction of 
social relationships. Bourdieu’s bad gift of violence is thus bad in two different ways: 
it imposes violence of obligations, and it also helps power relations to take shape. It is 
Bourdieu’s bad gift that reveals the obligatory nature of false gifts and the working of 
misrecognition. From this point of departure, various thinkers declare “generosity 
begets obligations” (“Prisoners in Silken Bonds” 89) or even denies the existence of a 
true gift.
32 
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of true gifts in her own way. She makes her assertion straightforward: “I argue that a gift always 
already is a commodity prior to its recognition as a gift. Gift economies can only disguise the 
calculation and negotiation that informs all economic practices. Benevolence and generosity, while 
pretending to disinterestedness, become alternatives to slef-interest only in that they facilitate power 
relations through what Bourdieu calls a ‘misrecognition’ of their obligatory natures” (“Her Gift” 217). 
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IV. The Gift in Between 
There are good gifts. There are bad gifts. But, a Bataillean gift doesn’t belong. It 
simply does not fall into either category easily. It is a mutable gift given through the 
drive of expenditure. The mutable nature of the Bataillean gift is simply a reflection 
of the multi-form expenditure. 
A Bataillean gift is capable of being bad 
Bataille bases his view of the gift on the idea of expenditure. His observation of 
the gift is conducted completely under the scope of general economy. Economy aims 
to encourage balanced exchange, of money, goods, and many others. For him, the gift 
demands equivalent return or reciprocity otherwise. The only gift that does not 
demand so is a gift similar to potlatch. Bataille’s gift therefore reveals a very negative 
connotation in its competitive and threatening form. The reason to give, as understood 
by Bataille, bears no mark of benevolence either. He especially speaks of the reason 
why people offer lavish gifts. Throughout “The Notion of Expenditure,” he believes 
the reason is that, since lavish gifts never demand reciprocity, lavish gifts are given 
out of our primal need for ever-increasing expenditure. When Mark Singleton 
elaborates on this idea, he maintains that “only when the loss is so great that further 
returns are definitively forestalled can the rite come to an end” (304). Whether such 
gift-giving is the behavior reflecting the unexplained primal need of expenditure or a 
means to shame the recipient, it definitely bears a fairly negative connotation. 
Bataille also believes that gift-giving may serve the purpose of flaunting private 
wealth as one’s worldly success. While considering gifts like potlatch, Bataille points 
out the lavishness of the gift, simply like the prodigality of the potlatch, becomes the 
gauge of transaction’s success. In such competitive and power-demonstrating 
gift-giving, the giver places both himself and his wealth at the risk of an 
immeasurable loss. The negative nature of the Bataillean gift jeopardizes both the Dahn  75
recipient and the giver, and in the meantime poisons the act of giving. 
Also pointed out by Mark Singleton is the fact that Bataille is the first inspirer to 
Derrida who gives him the idea of the impossibility of the gift when Bataille first 
associates the word “impossible” with an experience of a dissimilar nature: 
A gift wholly given, one that escapes the economy of return, must therefore 
be regarded (in what is surely an allusion to Bataille by Derrida) as “[n]ot 
impossible, but the impossible. The very face/figure of the impossible” The 
“impossible,” of course, is the term employed by Bataille to convey the 
essence of his own inner experience and to indicate the nature of all 
authentic sovereignty. (Singleton 310) 
By being the prototype of the Derridian impossible gift, the negative nature of the 
Bataillean gift is again brought forth to side with the “bad gift.” In this context, its 
being a bad gift appears convincing and feasible. Nevertheless, some may think 
Bataille is probably not the sole reason for Derrida to develop his idea of the 
impossibility of the gift, because Derrida was in part inspired by Mauss. When 
Derrida first induces his thought from Mauss, he has already suggested a viewpoint 
similar to the gift as the impossible by asking: If the gift is good, how can one 
possibly achieve and forget about it? How can one possibly desire not to keep (Given 
Time 36). Still, this is not to rule out Bataille’s influence on Derrida in terms of his 
idea of the link between the gift and the impossible. 
Through our first contact with the Bataillean gift, we may well declare that it 
either demands a return as any transaction does in its economic logic, or denies a 
return because it poses a confrontational challenge of wealth or authority. It is 
seemingly a bad gift, before we acquire a further understanding of it. Yet now, a closer 
look at Bataille shall be taken and this closer look is about to shed some new light on 
the Bataillean gift. Dahn  76
A Bataillean gift is capable of being vague 
How Bataille contributes to the gift discourse is by his approach of general 
economy; what Bataille contributes to the gift discourse is his idea of expenditure 
(sometimes interchangeable with “consumption” in the English translation of his 
discussions). For Bataille, all things have their connections with economy and the 
study of general economy is the key to all questions in diverse disciplines (The 
Accursed Share 10). He especially focuses on the “unproductive expenditure of 
excess associated with gift cultures” (Mifsud 90). He once explains the importance of 
general economy in terms of how exchange cannot be studied in isolation as an 
independent act by using the amusing analogy of fixing a flat tire without the 
awareness of the existence of the car. For him, all things can find themselves located 
in a certain place in the world of economy, and this all-connecting economy must be 
taken into consideration. 
What Bataille really offers us for the interpretation of the story of Salomé is his 
idea of expenditure derived from general economy. He relates this idea of expenditure 
to artistic creation, using poetry for example. It is in the sense of expenditure that we 
first understand the creation of poetry and then through this understanding we are led 
further into the interpretation of the biblical story of Salomé. 
According to Bataille, human beings, contrary to common belief, are not 
creatures of production: 
Humans are drawn to excessive expenditure rather than 
accumulation…They are creatures of consumption, not production, and they 
are enthralled by an ongoing desire for enchantment captured in the emotive, 
erotic, and exuberant forms that our existence sometimes takes. (The Dahn  77
Accursed Share 19)
33 
It is thus believed by Bataille, from the basest creatures to human beings, that 
expenditure is not only a primitive drive but also a necessity in that when a system, 
either a corporeal body or a political body, acquires too much intake of energy, it must 
release the excess. When the system stops its development, the energy is no longer in 
demand. It must, therefore, seek to dispense it, to spend it, to rid itself of the excess. 
After Bataille lays down the idea of expenditure as a primal drive, he comes to 
explain how this drive is related to artistic creation like poetry, a creation by means of 
loss, namely, by expenditure. 
That is to say, on the premise that all creatures, fully supplied and gratified, are 
capable of dispensation of excess, or in Batailles’s wording, capable of expenditure. 
Since expenditure is a necessary reaction to excess, related to the primitive need to 
exhaust oneself of superfluous energy, the act of giving away what is excessive and 
unnecessary is not only possible, but also a rewarding relief itself which asks for no 
returned favor. 
Now let’s try to weigh over the vagueness of the Bataillean gift: on the one end 
of the scales we have the possibility to give, on the other end, we have the drive to 
dispense. The vagueness of the Bataillean gift results from the fact that an 
undemanding gift is possible but the gift-giving seems to be for one’s own good. One 
must give away what is excessive and coercive of sharing. The gift is possible, but it 
has nothing to do with generosity. Unless, as in the later discussion of John the Baptist, 
what is excessive and coercive of sharing—the content of expenditure—is already 
good by nature or even good itself. 
Although Bataille may be influential to Derrida in suggesting to him the idea of 
the impossibility of the gift, the Batailllean gift is itself full of possibilities: the 
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possibility of the gift, the possibility of the gift to be good, the possibility of the gift to 
be vague, and the possibility to be good.   
A Bataillean gift is capable of being good 
As suggested above, Bataille’s gift can be good under certain circumstances. In 
the following example, the nature of the expenditure makes the gift good. One is an 
example of artistic creation, poetry; the other is an example of religious impulses, 
charity or devotion.   
The link between economy and poetry is a completely original perspective to the 
understanding of creation. It is also at the same time a proof to the Bataillean 
statement that all things fall into the realm of economy. The full text which mentions 
such a link reads as follows: 
The term poetry, applied to the least degraded and least intellectualized 
forms of the expression of a state of loss, can be considered synonymous 
with expenditure; it in fact signifies, in the most precise way, creation by 
means of loss. (“The Notion of Expenditure” 120) 
The creation by means of loss is an art form achieved through emotional 
loss—despair, bereavement, or other disadvantage experienced by the poet. It is also a 
creation by mean of loss in the sense that it aims to lose the excess of emotional 
residue—“the vertigo,” “the rage” as Bataille phrases them (“The Notion of 
Expenditure” 171). What differentiates it from the previous talk on expenditure is that 
it is here sublimated into a drive to rhyme other than an impulse to squander. 
Also mentioned is the idea of expenditure to the specific time of the Middle Ages 
in terms of religion. In The Accursed Share, Bruce Holsinger points out that Bataille 
describes the Middle Ages as a period of “limitless expenditure constantly in tension 
with the demands of religious ascesis and self-denial” (44-45). This limitless 
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for production (ibid). The religious observation is here likened to the economic 
activity. 
The reasoning of creation as an act of expenditure (in both its senses) and the 
connection between the religious impulses and economic expenditure are our main 
recourse to Bataille for our reading of the story of Salomé. Again, the Bataillean gift 
is actually an ambiguous one by nature in that it avoids consideration of generosity 
and altruism and instead relies on economic dispensation of excess as a primitive 
drive to give. On the other hand, the Bataillean gift of expenditure the Bataillean gift 
goes far beyond the physical, monetary economy into the spiritual economy and 
emotional residue. One may find it applicable to our later discussion of John the 
Baptist’s death as a gift. Batailles’s gift is a gift of in-betweenness which trespasses on 
a territory of blurred distinction between a good gift and a bad gift. 
There is actually a certain similar streak between Bataille’s idea of expenditure 
and Hyde’s idea of consumption. In our previous discussion, which features Hyde’s 
comment on art as a transient gift, the idea of consumption is introduced to explain 
the gift of art is presented, accepted, and consumed at the same time. This view on 
artistic creation provides us with one more perspective to look at Salomé’s dance as a 
gift of art. In comparison, Bataille focuses on expenditure. This focus can at first 
appears as an opposite, yet the logic is not at all contradictory. Bataille takes creation 
as an act of dispensing excess. This necessary expenditure must be enacted for the 
excess in one to be consumed by other. In Hyde’s case, such consumption takes place 
when the gift-giving is intended; in Bataillle’s case, such consumption takes place 
when gift-giving is needed. The points of departure may differ, but the working of 
consumption is in both cases what contributes to creation.   
This is only another supplementary note to the vagueness of Bataille’s gift, since 
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one of those scholars who speak less directly and less frequently of the gift and yet 
brings forth preponderant influence that lasts and spreads. 
How can John’s death be understood as a Bataillean gift? Is it the kind of gift that 
falls into the general economy and demands a return or is it the kind that denies 
emulation and stops the exchange? It may take no efforts for us to agree on the latter. 
The irrevocable, irrecoverable death does not and cannot in anyway reciprocated. The 
“giving up” or “giving out” of an individual’s life can not be compensated. Death is 
meant to be irreplaceable. For the person, who dies with his very life consumed, any 
later other lives given will never be able to bring back the life consumed. There is 
simply not a possible way to replace the original life in the original flesh with any life 
else. 
What really interests us is the latter question, which brings out the gift quality in 
the death of John the Baptist. How, following Bataille’s concept of creation, can 
John’s death be read as an act of expenditure? The two questions are exactly the 
reason why we resort to the Bataillean gift for a thorough comprehesion of the Salomé 
story. 
As a lavish gift that cannot be reciprocated, John’s death can be examined in the 
following relationships respectively: as a gift for Herod, which enables consolidation 
of authority; as a gift for Salomé, as a reward for her dance; as a gift for Herodias, as 
a revenge offered by her daughter; as a gift for Jesus, as to protect Jesus by Herod’s 
fear of John. The presentation of the first three gifts, as a gift to Herod, Salomé, and 
Herodias, is actually carried out in a linear course. John’s head first comes off under 
the permission of Herod. It first stops at Herod as a gift first for himself. The death of 
John then is handed from Herod to Salomé, as a gift granted for her performance of 
the dance of death (or, dance that causes death), and finally as a gift from the daughter 
Salomé to the mother Herodias. The death of John is thus in a linear course of Dahn  81
gift-giving takes on a three-fold meaning. When the gift of death lands on each other, 
the significance alters and means in a different way. The last functioning of the death 
as a gift to Jesus is outside the linear structure of gift-giving and to be discussed in 
another context. 
The Death of John, a Bataillean gift 
For the death of John to be a Bataillen gift, we must first come to realize how it 
can be viewed as a presentation of expenditure. In the earlier discussion of the 
connection between expenditure and religious impulses, the quote of Holsinger tells 
of the “limitless expenditure” of religion which encourages sacrifice and self-denial. 
If this sacrifice and self-denial can be understood as the essence of charity or love (in 
their Christian sense), then John the Baptist’s dauntless confrontation and blame to the 
faces of Herod and Herodias might be enacted and driven along by his Christian sense 
of duty to right the wrong of incest. What functions as excess, as the religious 
impulses here is John’s Christian sense of righteousness, through which what went 
wrong can be set right again. When such a wrong is righted, the Christian love is 
served; so is righteousness. 
If the title “Baptist” is to be taken literally to understand John, the title then 
points directly to the significance of his role as a cleansing agent, a washer of sin and 
crime. The drive that keeps him preaching the Christian teachings and serving 
righteousness then becomes his psychological excess or emotional residue. The sense 
of duty in John must find its way to fulfillment. While some may think that it is 
Salomé’s dance that causes the exchange of a dance for a head, a more considerate 
reflection can help reveal that it is John’s Christian sense of duty and righteousness 
that sends him into the hand of Herod. It is a corollary of John’s expenditure of his 
love and justice. The Christian love must be spread out through the serving of justice. 
John the Baptist is to serve this purpose and to defy the authority of the worldly king Dahn  82
and queen. This driving force of Christian’s duty in him takes shape as the Bataillean 
expenditure. This expenditure fits the description of Holsinger’s description and does 
transform itself into religious impulses that transcend the concern of death. 
Besides its allusion to the religious impulses, the idea of expenditure is also 
related to the creation of poetry in our earlier discussion. Already mentioned is the 
idea that “the expression of a state of loss” is in its sense “synonymous with 
expenditure.” The state of loss of righteousness in John is synonymous with 
expenditure both in theory and in practice. In theory, it follows Bataille’s logic. In 
practice, it is expressed right to the source of iniquity (Herod and Herodias), to the 
marriage of incest. John performs a reproach against loss of shame and morality, and 
it is performed by means of his expenditure of the boundless Christian righteousness 
and charity. He spends himself to redeem. 
As John is driven by such force of expenditure, so is the creation of poetry. 
Poetry is believed by Bataille to be the best example of such creation by means of loss 
(“The Notion of Expenditure” 120). In more than one book by him, he postulates the 
same idea: 
The profound importance of poetry is of the sacrifice of words, of images, 
and by virtue of the misery of this sacrifice…, it causes a slipping from 
impotent sacrifice of objects to that of the subject. (Inner Experience 208) 
In this manner, a poet, through his employment of words and images, composes 
poetry. In the process of composition, these words and images are consumed, along 
with his emotional residue or spiritual excess. This state of loss (intended for creation) 
is described by Bataille as a state of misery, a state of sacrifice. This is actually a 
two-fold consumption: a consumption of the poet’s output of poetic devices and a 
consumption of the poet’s spirit, namely the poet himself. Hence it converts the 
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subject (the poet himself). 
This understanding of the poet and poetic creation, when applied to John the 
Baptist and his preaching of righteousness, immediately speaks for itself. While the 
poet has a drive to voice the emotional residue and spiritual excess, the Baptist has a 
drive to serve righteousness and reproach iniquity. The fulfillment of the expression of 
the emotion and spirit of the poet is achieved through his sacrifice, in the form of 
poetic creation; the fulfillment of the expression of righteousness and the Christian 
duty is achieved through John’s sacrifice, in the form of death. The expenditure force 
in the poet forces out creation of poetry; the expenditure force in the Baptist forces 
out dauntless assertion of righteousness. The former creation makes a poet; the latter 
creation defines the saint. This is a creation of unselfish devotion to the Christian duty 
and sense of righteousness. 
John’s irrecoverable death, beyond all compensation, is nothing short of 
Bataille’s reference to the “sacrificial expenditure,” “absolute loss,” a spiritual 
“squandering without reciprocity” in a righteous cause (The Accursed Share 38). John 
offers a Bataillean gift which is destined to be unrequited. The richness it poses   
exceeds that by a potlatch. The absolutely sacrificial nature of it denies all possibility 
of reciprocation. John’s gift is a genuine gift that is composed of generosity and 
commands no return. 
John’s death is in theory and in practice a Bataillean gift.
34  How then is the gift 
significant in terms of different personae it is presented to? 
The Death of John, a multifold gift 
The gift of the death of John first comes into King Herod’s hand. It is a gift; yet, 
a gift of a very eccentric nature. It is a compulsory gift imposed on Herod, though it 
does not demand a returned favor. The gift of death actually denies reciprocation. It is 
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a gift bestowed on Herod against his will, for Herod did not dare to kill John. On the 
contrary, he always attempted the opposite—to protect John from being killed at 
Herodias’ will. The gift of death is forced on Herod. 
The gift is a demand of John’s death. When Herod finds himself on a point of no 
return because of the promise he makes to Salomé, he is forced to allow the execution 
of John. John’s death could have been a mere loss to Herod since it happens against 
Herod’s will. However, the death is allowed under the circumstances of Salomé’s 
request and the courtiers’ witness. The circumstances make all the difference. They 
turn the original loss into a gain. Hence, it becomes a gift. 
Under the said circumstances, the death of John becomes a gift to Herod. First, 
the circumstances which involve the witness of the courtiers force Herod to keep his 
words as a king. When he does accordingly, his authority as the king is further 
consolidated, as we previously notice. In this manner, Herod fulfills his obligation to 
his courtiers. King Herod, as a result, benefits from his own promise to others. Second, 
to Salomé, this is a promise fulfilled by the promise-maker. This is a closure to 
Herod’s promise to Salomé. 
An accidental gain may also be incurred by this gift of death. From the biblical 
text, we learn that Herod may attempt John’s death, but dares not: “when he [Herod] 
would have put him [John] to death, he [Herod] feared the multitude, because they 
counted him [John] as a prophet” (Matthew 14.5). For long, John has been the source 
of guilt for both Herodias and Herod. Herodias is obviously more aggressive in her 
attempt to kill, while Herod shows more concern about the consequences. This 
description in the Book of Matthew does tell us Herod’s similar intention to Herodias’. 
The only difference is the intensity in between. Herodias’ is desperately regardless of 
consequences; Herod’s is biding the time. Salomé’s request exactly contributes to the 
advent of such a time. By fulfilling his promise to Salomé, Herod rids himself of the Dahn  85
source of guilt. Or, if guilt comes from oneself not from others, the guilt is at least 
successfully silenced. 
The gift of death next finds its way into the hand of Salomé. For Salomé, this is 
something she earns with her dance. This gift, however, does not seem to do her any 
good in the first place. It is a gift chosen by someone else instead of herself. Her 
preference for a gift is not in any way involved in this choice of gift. In a sense, the 
gift is also forced upon her. 
According to the Book of Mark, the request of John’s head is a decision made by 
Herodias, Salomé’s mother, and obviously for Herodias herself: “And she [Salomé] 
went forth, and said unto her mother, What shall I ask? And she [Herodias] said, the 
head of John the Baptist” (Mark 6.24). This choice of gift is of no interest to the 
dancer Salomé. It is actually to Salomé more of a loss than a gain. 
Herod’s promise tells of the power, wealth, among many other benefits that “half 
a kingdom” may entail. Salomé loses all these for a dead head. The dead head helps to 
silence John’s accusation of the incestuous relationship between Herodias and Herod, 
but it makes no difference to Salomé because the fact remains that she is at the mercy 
of someone who drives away her own father, usurps the kingdom, and marries her 
mother. What good is it to Salomé to ask for the dead head? 
There is no other answer than to say the choice of gift answers her mother’s need. 
Salomé’s gift has only one purpose—to be handed to her mother for her mother’s gift. 
The reason why Salomé let Herodias make the decision is of course to return the gift 
of birth, whose logic and reasoning has been formerly examined. This is a gift asked 
for on behalf of a mother. It is a daughter’s gift. It is earned by the daughter, of no use 
to the daughter, at the cost of all other gains, in order to be presented to the mother. It 
is now a conspicuously generous, unselfish gift. The dancer presents a gift of dance 
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responsible and necessary to return favor to. 
The most climatic scene of the biblical story is also the weakest link of the story. 
As a story of gift economy, every link of the gift flow is significant and solid, except 
when the gift travels to the place where Salomé’s dance is danced for the death John 
dies. The direct cause of this exchange will make this weakest link of the story even 
more startling. 
The direct cause for John’s death is his fulfillment of the Christian duty and 
sense of righteousness; the only reason for Salomé’s choice of gift is her indebtedness 
to Herodias’ gift of birth as her mother, her responsibilities as a daughter. The meeting 
of two good causes should cause death! John’s cause costs his life; Salomé’ cause 
costs her would-gain fortune, and also costs her integrity, because she helps with 
murder. John’s principle of serving righteousness puts his life in danger and he dares 
to; Salomé’s principle of serving her mother puts her gain in danger and she obeys so. 
These two originally least involved and hence innocent agents in the economy of hau 
suffer the greatest loss and contribute to the possible gift. John’s will to give makes 
his gift-giving in a good cause; so does Salomé’s. It is Herod’s misuse of John’s will 
to give, and Herodias’ misuse of Salomé’s will to give that cause evil out of their 
innocent gifts. The former abuses the sense of righteousness; the latter abuses the 
filial commitment. 
Next, the gift travels from Salomé to Herodias. As the last paragraph concludes, 
Herodias abuses Salomé’s filial commitment. According to textual evidence alone, the 
sense of indebtedness might be the only reason for Salomé to ask for something on 
behalf of her mother. In the biblical story, in the gift economy between Salomé and 
Herod, Herod first offers Salomé survival at court and invitation to his birthday 
banquest; Salomé seizes the opportunity to show gratitude and to reciprocate with her 
gift of dance; Herod, as a king, offers another gift to reward her for the dance—his Dahn  87
offer of “unto the half of my kingdom” for her gift keeps intact the nature of his gift 
as a lordly potlatch that demonstrates authority and denies return. What goes wrong is 
the insertion of Herodias’ will to kill. 
The gift from Herod for Salomé immediately intercepted by Herodias’ will and 
directly turns into a gift for Herodias. While both John and Salomé suffer loss, 
Herodias claims her gain; so does Herod (he rids himself of the voice of guilt). The 
gift for Herodias is significant in the sense that it is actually a gift for two—a mutual 
gift shared between Herod and Herodias. When the text reads, “and the king was sorry: 
nevertheless for the oath’s sake, and them which sat with him at meat, he commanded 
it to be given her” (Matt. 14.9), we doubt if he is sorry for he might anger the 
multitude he always fears. 
If Herod had nothing against John and had from the very beginning faced his 
own sin and known his fault, he would not have John in prison. The imprisonment 
only tells of two things: Herod dislikes John as Herodias for the accusation of their 
incestuous marriage and his deep concerns about people’s reaction towards his 
behavior against John. Herod may now offer his gratitude to Herodias. Macbeth’s kill 
has been executed through Lady Macbeth’s words. The gift of death is thus a perfect 
gift for anniversary shared between the royal husband and wife. In other words, if we 
further our observation of the traveling hau in this linear development of gift-giving, 
we can see the hau finally, as Mauss tells us, travels back to the primal giver. 
Herodias’ gift may be taken as in the end a gift for her husband—a gift that finally 
settles the qualms between them for their unlawful marriage. 
In the very beginning of the biblical text, both in the Book of Matthew and in the 
Book of Mark, there is a misidentity between John and Jesus. This yet forms another 
relationship of exchange. In the Bible, the whole story is a narrative that unfolds 
backwards. It starts with the present scenario where Herod mistakes Jesus for John. Dahn  88
From the story of wonders that reach his ear, he infers that the practitioner of healing 
miracles must be John who comes back to life from death. This (mis)belief of Herod 
simply serves to protect Jesus and his disciples from threats or dangers caused by 
Herod. For Herod fears John, even after John’s death. The fear and the guilt loom 
large enough to check Herod’s sensibility and to cause his misunderstanding of two 
separate identities. 
This grants an extra gift for Jesus. John the Baptist’s death grants security for 
Jesus and his disciples. His assertion of the righteous cause offers to protect Jesus 
even after he is long gone. The gift of death for Jesus is a gift that travels across a 
temporal and spatial gap and reaches a remote third party who previously remained 
not at all involved in their gift economy—the third, total other. John’s gift of death is 
in this case a perfect Levinasian gift for the tout autre, the total other. 
In the reading of John’s gift of death as a Bataillean gift, we not only realize the 
possibilities of the gift but also realize the denial of such possibilities shall lose the 
multifold shades of meanings in the ancient biblical tale in a whole new light. 
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V. The Gift of Death 
Derridia’s Impossible Gift 
As all gifts begin with Mauss, all gifts end with Derrida. For it is Mauss who 
draws the attention of modern scholarships to the gift as an issue; for it is Derrida who 
declares the impossibility of the gift and with his pervasive influence we are 
convinced and assert the death of the gift likewise. Derrida’s attitude toward the gift is 
extremely different from the previous thinkers and is differently extreme. Mauss 
associates the gift with obligations; Levinas relates the gift to other; Cixous accounts 
the gift for a female experience; Hyde refers to the gift as art; Bataille beholds the gift 
as bipolar and vague; Bourdieu views the gift as violence. The extremity Derrida 
heads for is—there is no such a thing as a gift. Fortunately, the statement is not the 
end of discussion. On the contrary, his discussion starts thereby. 
The most famous denial of the gift by Derrida is published in his “The Time of 
the King”: 
For there to be a gift, it is necessary that the donee not give back, amortize, 
reimburse, acquit himself, enter into a contract, and that he never have 
contracted a debt…[It] is thus necessary, at the limit, that he not recognize 
the gift as gift. If he recognizes it as gift, if the gift appears to him as such, 
if the present is present to him as present, this simple recognition suffices to 
annul the gift. Why? Because it gives back, in the place, let us say, of the 
thing itself, a symbolic equivalent. (Given Time 13) 
This passage, among all other similar statements, is the most famous and infamous 
charge of the gift’s inexistence. This is an elaboration upon his early declaration in the 
same book. When Derrida refers to the gift in the beginning of Given Time, he speaks 
of the gift as being “Not impossible but the impossible. The very figure of the 
impossible. It announces itself, gives itself to be thought as the impossible” (8). This Dahn  90
is to say, the gift is not simply impossible, but also an exemplar of all things 
impossible. It is impossibility itself. 
Derrida lays down a set of very strict rules to define the gift. The ultimate 
principle and the premise is that it has to be something that entails not even a hint of 
reciprocity. If it demands a countergift, it is not a gift; if it begets obligations, it is not 
a gift; if it is presented as a gift, and since gifts always remind of obligations, it is no 
gift; if anything in the gift can be associated with obligations or indebtedness of any 
kind, it is then no gift. Therefore, under most circumstances, the gift is simply 
impossible. Ken Jackson makes his remark on Derrida curt and clear: “For Derrida, 
there is no gift in gift exchange; there is only gift” (39). Exactly, where there is 
exchange, there is no gift; where there is a gift, there should be no exchange. Yet the 
latter situation in which no exchange is perceived or under its way is almost 
non-existent. Hence, the gift is again impossible. The most exemplar of it is that, 
when a gift is declared or recognized as a gift, it is no longer a gift.
35 
Derrida furthers his statement to the point of being even more extreme, when he 
speaks of the possibility of the gift: 
But the one who gives it must not see it or know it either; otherwise he 
begins, at the threshold, as soon as he intends to give, to pay himself with a 
symbolic recognition, to praise himself, to approve of himself, to gratify 
                                                 
35  Apparently, feminist theorists devoted to the issue of the gift have their assertions otherwise. For 
them, the reason for the aggressive denial of the possibility of the gift lies in that thinkers addressing 
the masculine exchange economy (among them, Bataille, Bourdieu, and Derrida are mentioned) are 
considerably affected by the following ideas: 1. they deny the possibility of simply receiving a gift 
without the concern of return; such a denial reflects a masculine fear of indebtedness; 2. their 
recognition of an originally well-intended good gift simply makes the reception unforgettable and 
furthers such fear; 3. their theoretical premise that the concept of altruistic generosity is absent in the 
human nature; human nature is simply void of Good. For detailed discussions please refer to “Gender 
Constructions and the Possibility of a Generous Economic Actor” by Iulie Aslaksen and “Prisoners in 
Silken Bonds” by Cynthia Klelar. Both claim their theoretical stance firm, both leave some points 
explained (For example, the feminine generosity is essential and benign without a logical reasoning. 
Likewise, the masculine generosity is deceptive and malignant and such a concept is introduced into 
their discussion as a common understanding that needs no explanation.), and both pose convincing 
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himself, to congratulate himself, to give back to himself symbolically the 
value of what he thinks he has given or what he is preparing to give. (Given 
Time 14) 
The ideal Derridian gift must then be something given with its given process 
unintelligible, with its giver unaware of the giving, and with its presence as something 
else other than a gift. A gift can be a gift only when it is not a gift in its secular 
definition. A gift, according to Derrida, should be something independent and 
secluded from its giver, giving, and presentation. The statement that a gift is a gift 
only when it is not a gift may be too extreme to make, but when one curtails Derrida’s 
idea to the shortest, this is exactly what he means by the word “gift.” 
The above understanding of the gift by Derrida enables him to relate the gift to 
something as elusive for a convincing metaphor. For “the experiential structure of the 
gift…makes its presence impossible, in a pure form,” and a giver aware of the 
intention to give immediately engages himself in “poisoning the gift and rendering it 
ultimately null” (Einsohn 44), Derrida suggests that the gift is “never anything but a 
simulacrum” (Given Time 31)—an insubstantial form or resemblance of the thing, a 
trace.
36  The gift is a term that designates something inexistent. It is a simulacrum, an 
empty signifier that signifies nothing. 
While most people stop here and end their understanding of the Derridian gift, 
Derrida actually comes this far only to pave the way for his further discussion of the 
gift. “One must still render an account of the possibility of this simulacrum and of the 
desire that impels toward this simulacrum” (Given Time 31)—this is the true objective 
                                                 
36  The two allusions of “simulacrum” and “trace” here are immediately recognizable as marks of Jean 
Baudrillard and Jacques Derrida. While Baudrillard points out “The simulacrum is never that which 
conceals the truth—it is the truth which conceals that there is none. The simulacrum is true” (166), 
Derrida relates the idea of trace to the gift. In an interview entitled “There Is No One Narcissism,” he 
says that the experience of forgetting is similar to cinder, a mere trace, “namely something that remains 
without remaining, which is neither present nor absent…is also the possibility of the relation to the 
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of the premise that the gift is the impossible. The gift is the impossible. It is the first 
thing to be understood in order to usher in the genuine gift—the gift of death, as later 
expounded by Derrida in his reading of the biblical story of Abraham’s sacrifice of 
Issac’s death.
37 
In this biblical story of Abraham, Derrida finds the genuine gift that meets his 
definition. First, it is a gift for God. God is of course beyond human understanding. 
He is the ultimate representative of the unknown, or the tout autre, the total other. The 
gift is therefore bound for no awareness of it as a gift. The recipient is the unknown. 
This inability to confirm the recipient can lead to the denial of Abraham as a giver. 
The unknown nature of the would-be recipient obscures the act of giving and the role 
of the giver. As a result, it deprives the giver the consciousness of his giving as a 
praiseworthy or rewarding deed. Abraham is thus conditioned not to be rewarded 
neither in fact nor in name. Abraham’s possibility to pride himself over the gift-giving 
and “poisoning the gift and rendering it ultimately null” is annulled. 
Second, “the donee” is not in any sense to give back. The unknown nature of 
God furthers itself to deny any promise of reward. Or, from a different angle, 
Abraham does not have “that luxury, that secret sense of credit that he will be 
compensated” (Jackson 42). God, the total other, stops the potential threat of 
economic exchange from either side, and makes the gift possible. It is a gift from the 
giver’s view, for there is nearly no definite, known recipient; it is a gift from the 
unknown recipient’s angle, for God does not interact in the gift economy as a human 
being; it is a gift, all by itself, in that the act of giving hardly stands. 
Third, the sacrifice of Issac by Abraham to God was first demanded as an order, 
a crucial test of faith, not a gift request. There is no bargain driven between God and 
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rather, it is a pregnant starting point (7). For related observation and analysis, please refer to 
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men. From the very beginning, the human sacrifice does not take on any gift-giving 
form. It is not presented as a gift. It therefore comes in the pure form of a gift. The 
following is Derrida’s logic of the gift, as observed by John Caputo: “The gift pure 
and simple does not make an appearance, never presents itself” (Caputo 160). 
As the analysis laid out above, Ken Jackson’s conclusion on Derrida’s idea of the 
gift is better understood. “The idea of God,” says he, “is, in short, very much 
connected to that of the gift” (41). For both God and the gift to be, the being of the 
other is a necessity. The other is the primal cause for both. In either case, if the other 
is known, it fails to be a gift. Following the definition of the Levinasian other, a sense 
of total ignorance of the other is indispensable. The logic is that by knowing any 
slight portion of the other, the other is internalized into my knowledge of it. It 
becomes part of me. Its alterity is thus destroyed and made impure by me. It has to 
remain a complete stranger, a total other (Caputo 209). 
This idea of the tout autre is very important in understanding the relationship 
between John the Baptist and Princess Salomé. John’s head/death is also a gift for the 
tout autre. Unlike Wilde’s Salomé, in the biblical story, there is not any interaction 
between John and Salomé. Neither does John know he is about to give his life out of 
Salomé’s demand. He, we assume, may be aware of the danger of his insistence on 
reproaching Herod and Herodias for their sin. If he is aware and still insists, he is 
ready to devote himself to the cause of God, to right the wrong. His death is then 
dedicated to God or Salomé. In either case, it is a pure gift. Both God and Salomé 
constitute the idea of otherness. Both are unknown. The donee is unknown to the giver. 
In Salomé’s case, this is even literally true. John is not aware of the gift to give; 
neither does Salomé have the idea until the last minute when Herodias suggests so. 
The Death of Abraham and the Death of John 
The death of John is like the death of Isaac. Both are devoted to God, the Dahn  94
ultimate tout autre. Yet I argue that the gift of John’s death is even purer. Isaac’s death 
is to be executed by a conscious agent of the sacrifice, namely Abraham. Isaac is of 
course without the knowledge of this sacrifice or test, but it is to be given through the 
hand of Abraham. Although God is unknown to any human understanding by nature, 
Abraham attains a certain degree of familiarity with it. Only the human understanding 
capacity is too confined within its own limited sphere. Yet, there is a hint of contact, 
and contact constitutes familiarity. Familiarity makes the unawareness between the 
giver and the receiver impossible. The gift is then no longer pure. 
In the case of John, even the slightest hint of contact or familiarity is absent. The 
concern that the giver may have problems forgetting about the giving and may 
therefore annul the gift is superfluous. The giver is never aware of the giving before 
death; and after death, even more unlikely. It is in this way a purer gift compared with 
that offered by Abraham. The only thing the giver might have been aware was that he 
was headlong about the Christian teachings and dared to defy worldly authority in 
defense of righteousness and might therefore endanger himself. Other than that, he 
would have no idea about the time and the occasion and the circumstances under 
which his life is claimed by the other. 
While God appears as the ultimate other, Salomé serves as the worldly 
representative of the tout autre in human flesh. The ignorance of the giver about the 
giving is thus stressed by Derrida through the famous biblical quotation: 
Take heed that ye do not your alms before men, to be seen of them: 
otherwise ye have no reward of your Father which is in heaven. Therefore 
when thou doest thine alms, do not sound a trumpet before thee, as the 
hypocrites do in the synagogues and in the streets, that they may have glory 
of men. Verily I say unto you, They have their reward. But when thou doest 
alms, let not they left hand know what thy right hand doeth: That thine alms Dahn  95
may be in secret; and thy Father which seeth in secret himself shall reward 
thee openly. (Matt. 6.1-4)
38 
Salomé as the other in this discussion reveals a brand new aspect of the relationship 
between John and her. In our previous discussion, their relationship appears to be the 
weakest link on the route of hau. While the gift travels from place to place, from one 
onto the other, an established relationship is always there to connect the two parties 
involved in the gift-giving. Herod is the king who holds the potlatch for his courtiers 
and he is also the new father to Salomé; Salomé as someone at the mercy of Herod 
shows her gratitude accordingly by a dance; Herodias, as Salomé’s mother, claims her 
right to a revenge through her daughter’s hand. Therefore, in our previous discussion, 
we find the linkage between Salomé and John is the weakest. There is not any 
attachment of one to the other. Yet the linkages in between other characters constitute 
only gifts of violence; the weakest link, or the absence of an obvious link between 
them, is the best proof to John’s death as the pure gift. John’s death is thus a pure form 
of gift for Salomé. Derrida’s idea of the pure gift is in this case proved possible. 
Another aspect of the death of John as a gift can be examined under the 
relationship between Jesus and John. It was in the very beginning of the biblical story 
of Salomé that one was mistaken for the other by Herod. While John has been long 
dead, his identity still, by Herod’s misrecognition of Jesus, protects Jesus from being 
harmed or hunted after. What makes the gift of death particularly unique in this 
relationship is that not only the gift is not consciously intended, but the interval of 
time sets a literal example of Derrida’s gift of time. While Derrida’s idea of gift of 
time is based on an abstract, philosophical reasoning, the gift of death here perfectly 
matches the idea of the gift of time. Most of all, it is a literal match of the figurative 
                                                 
38  Quoted intact from The Gift of Death 108. Punctuations and spellings may be different from some 
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idea. The time between the death of John and the advent of Jesus forms a spatial and 
temporal moat. There is no way for the gift to be presented as a gift. It is the moat that 
serves time and space and makes the gift of John a pure gift for Jesus. 
As Derrida states in Given Time, a true gift “must not be restituted immediately 
and right way. There must be time, it must last, there must be waiting” (41). John’s 
death allows enough time and lasts, waiting all the while for the advent of Jesus, in 
order to lend itself to the becoming of a gift. A gift of death is thus a gift of time. 
“Faith is always a matter of the gift and giving” (Caputo 218). Yet in the story of 
Salomé, the matching features between faith and gift-giving are so numerous that it 
seems to speak directly on behalf of the gift theorists. 
Other aspects of the gift pointed out by Derrida are also to be noted. In The Gift 
of Death, he writes, “We have a responsibility to other (ethics) and another, abosolute 
responsibility to the tout autre (in this case, gods). And the two can be contradictory” 
(61-62). This helps us understand why Salomé’s gift is discussed previously in terms 
of human relationships and John’s gift of death is discussed here in terms of religion. 
In the story of Salomé, these two issues are both included. If not examined under 
different views of the gift, “the two can be contradictory.” 
In addition to the distinction of the aforementioned, Derrida observes that the gift 
is both within and without the system of gift circling. He postulates a couple of 
important gift features for us to notice by asking, “What is the gift as the first mover of 
the circle? And how does it contract itself into a circular contract?” (Given Time 31). 
That is to say, the gift assumes two roles and functions in the gift circle, or, in Mauss’ 
words, the kula. First, the gift is outside the circle, because it is the first cause that 
activates the circulation. Second, the gift is inside the circle, because it binds itself in 
the endless giving-receiving-giving process. It “contracts itself into it.” 
Looking back to our story, the following gifts can be reviewed in this perspective: Dahn  97
Herod’s birthday banquet, Salomé’s dance, and John’s death. In its literal sense in the 
story, Herod’s birthday celebration as a potlatch is the very first gift in the circle. It is 
the primal gift that triggers all the latter. Even if we agree with Levinas on that 
responsibilities proceed everything, it is Herod’s banquet that activates the gift circle. 
It is itself a starter before there is a circle in function; it is outside the circle. Yet it 
later gets all involved in the relationship between Herod and his courtiers and in that 
between Herod’s permission for Salomé’s survival and Salomé’s dance in return. 
Herod’s potlatch, when within the circle, is not a mere link of the circle, but a hub—a 
hub that two separate rounds of gift-giving cross their paths. 
Similarly, Salomé’s dance is as brusque as Herod’s banquet. Both are ideas out of 
nowhere. There were not any perceivable causes for them to take place. There might 
have been reasonable explanations for their decisions, yet there were no absolute 
corollaries for them to give a banquet or a dance. There is no textual evidence in the 
Bible that the dance by Salomé was a concealed scheme to kill John. The dance as 
well as the choice of a reward for the dance seems equally whimsical. Since there was 
no direct cause for the dance, it can be seen as outside the circle of gift-giving. It is an 
initiative idea. It then in the end leads to the death of John and the revenge on behalf 
of her mother, Herodias. The dance in this sense contracts itself into the circle of gift. 
On the contrary, the death of John maintains its detachment from such a circle. It 
is not a beginning of a circle; nor does it contract itself into the circle. It is quite 
obvious now under our discussion that this dual phenomenon of being within and 
without is Derrida’s description of the false gift. Therefore, the first two cases of 
Herod’s birthday banquet and Salomé’s dance under discussion fit the observation 
perfectly. However, this observation of some gifts starting the gift-giving circle does 
not be applied in the case of John’s death. It is passively made a gift; it is something 
caused by other events. It is one of the consequences of someone else’s decision. It Dahn  98
never vies to start anything actively as a gift, because it is a true gift. It is not outside 
the circle as a primal cause that triggers gift-giving. It is not within a circle that stirs 
the circulation of giving to go incessantly. It simply gives and then ends. It is not 
inside the circle. There is no circle in the third case of John’s death. A genuine gift 
does not fall into the category of something being within and without the circle at the 
same time. A genuine gift transcends the circle. 
The biblical story of Salomé begins with narratives. People report to Herod and 
Herod listens and then Herod comments on the report. This is how the story takes 
place in both the Book of Matthew and the Book of Mark. The report about a healer’s 
miracles is made, and then heard. The misidentification of Jesus for John is shared 
and a flashback is told. The story begins with narratives. A narratives first tells of that 
people heard something; a second narrative then speaks of a healer having come to 
perform miracles; a follow-up narrative say that the king thought that John came back 
to life; still one more narrative has it that the king killed John—the narrative above all 
narratives is given by the king. The whole story itself is a narrative composed of 
interlocked narratives. 
For Derrida, “the gift is a phenomenon profoundly implicated in time and 
narrativity” (Raskolnikov 49). While the gift of time in this story is discussed, we now 
focus on the issue of the gift of narrative. The narrative of the story is a genuine gift in 
two senses. 
First, there is a misidentification by Herod in the narrative. Through this 
misidentification, Jesus is mistaken for John and therefore the living Jesus walks in 
Herod’s fear of the beheaded John. The death of John is rendered a gift for Jesus and 
functions as a protection. This is a gift granted by a narrative. It is a gift of narrative. 
This gift is a genuine gift because the narrative and the misidentification in it are not 
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Second, all the narratives can be subsumed under one narrative: Herod’s 
narrative. It was from his narrative of surmise and misidentification that the present is 
explained (though falsely explained), the past is told, and the gifts (between the 
characters) are shown. The whole story is a recorded narrative in the Bible, a narrative 
in the collective cultural context of Christianity. It is a gift of narrative for the reader, 
for anyone who comes across the story, for generations to come. It is a gift of biblical 
narrative, a gift of memory and suspension of time. 
The Derridan reading, applied to the biblical story of Salomé, in either the scope 
of the impossible or in the scope of the pure gift, is revealed a multifold, viable 
approach in search for an in-depth understanding of the ancient tale. Although it is 
almost impossible for any gift to fit Derrida’s definition of the gift, John’s gift of 
death in the story of Salomé, through an analysis in various aspects, is proved to fit. 
One more type of gift to be specified here is the gift of love. This is the gift 
described and thought through in The Gift of Death. It is also the last type of gift 
featured by Derrida before his death. The gift of love as the final issue of the gift 
discourse is recurrent in his last work. 
Starting from a more familiar point of the gift of death, Derrida speaks of love’s 
ability to give the gift of death. For him, the only ability and possibility to give the 
gift of death, to give one’s life, comes from infinite and boundless love. It is a 
responsibility that demands irreplaceable singularity. This death can only be 
encouraged and achieved by love, in order to love the living by the act of death. This 
is the gift of love given by someone who dies an irreplaceable death in love’s cause 
(Gift of Death 51). Linda Greenwood shares this point of view by saying “Death is 
given as life for another, and death occurs at the point when the person is most alive” 
(187). As a martyr of his belief and the Christian love, John dies to serve the life of 
righteousness and the lives of other righteous people like him. It is also at the moment Dahn 100
of his sacrifice when the meaning of his life is fulfilled. This death is actually the 
most alive form and moment of life. The gift of death achieves two lives to their 
fullest. 
It is applicable and appropriate to say that John’s gift of death is a gift of love. It 
is salient that John’s love refers to the Christian charity for all good and against all 
evil. It is a generous love that intends to right the wrong. Salomé’s imbalanced and 
immoral gift to her mother is also acquired by love. Only her love for her mother may 
allow the imbalance between a will to give of a daughter and an evil gift demanded by 
a mother. Salomé’s role as a scapegoat destines her to shoulder or share the guilt and 
crime of the murder. She too gives a gift of blind love. It is at the same time a gift of 
death, her death of morality. By giving this gift of love for her mother, Salomé is 
morally dead. 
For most of us, the antithesis of love is hate. For Derrida, hate is the extension of 
love. This is especially true in John’s case. In explaining the idea of sacrifice, Derrida 
postulates that one must sacrifice what one loves. To do so, one must hate what one 
formerly loved in order to achieve the destruction of it. Sacrifice cannot be achieved 
by destroying what one already hates. In terms of sacrifice, to hate is to hate what one 
loves. To sacrifice is to enact the sacrifice of love to love (Gift of Death 64). In 
Greenwood’s understanding, we may have an even clearer view: “True sacrifice 
occurs when one is willing to put to death what one loves. In this sense ‘hate’ 
becomes an extension of a greater understanding of what love involves” (188). 
It is in this sense that Abraham has to sacrifice his only child; it is in this sense 
that John has to insist on his reproach to iniquity at the risk of his own life. The first 
impossible gift of Derrida is now proved possible. To our amazement, the impossible, 
hypocritical gift in Derrida’s eye can in the end be resolved into possibility. Even 
more amazing is that this is achieved warmly, romantically, through the power of love. Dahn 101
Love enables us to see the impossible as possible (59). In the final discussion of The 
Gift of Death, it seems that love alone is the sole fuel to light up life. Love seems to 
exceed all bonds. The philosopher in the end returns to an ancient trail of 
humanity—Amor vincit omnia, as the ancient Latin proverb goes—Love conquers all. 
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Conclusion 
In the gift discourse, one never forgets the remark on Mauss by Derrida: “One 
could go so far as to say…Marcel Mauss’s The Gift speaks of everything but the gift” 
(Given Time 24). Most of the time, the quote is posed as a disproof to Mauss’ point by 
Derrida. What follows up in Derrida’s original complete remark is often neglected. “It 
[The Gift] deals with economy, exchange, contract, it speaks of raising the stakes, 
sacrifice, gift and countergift—in short, everything that in the thing itself impels the 
gift and the annulment of the gift” (ibid). It is not a disproof. Derrida’s remark does 
not aim to express difference of opinion. This is an answer to Mauss’ study. This 
answer in Given Time echoes Derrida’s finial solution in The Gift of Death. 
Mauss’ Durkheimian discipline always leads him to the search of universality 
across societies and cultures. In the gift/ The Gift, universality is likewise sought. 
Derrida understands and pinpoints this. The gift is not so much about the gift; it is 
about the universality that runs through the relation and emotion beyond the act of 
giving. The gift/ The Gift is therefore not about the gift. It is no disproof. It is a true 
understanding. The gift is a key to the understanding of social structures, of human 
relationships. 
If one narrows down the scope of the gift discourse, a clear picture appears: it is 
a dialogue continued between Mauss and Derrida, with a lot of joint efforts in 
between. This is not to ignore other scholars’ devotion to this discourse. This is to 
wrap up the whole discourse in a nutshell: Mauss first poses the gift as an issue. 
Through probing the issue, he tries to seek the universal key to the understanding of 
human relationships. Derrida realizes and shares this realization. In the course of the 
discourse, scholars follow as the two seek the answer. In The Gift of Death, Derrida 
believes he finds it: love. Love alone enables gift-giving. 
The gift is never about the gift. It is about us. Hints are given along the way. Dahn 103
When La Caze and Sharp mention that the issue of the gift should be treated alongside 
the issue of friendship, they show their keen observation of such significance of the 
discourse. The fact that the gift is hard to define and theorists have been struggling for 
a convincing, comprehensive definition reveals its complication. This complication of 
the gift is to reflect the complication of human relationships. It is not a complication 
to solve; it is a complication to reflect upon. 
It is of dialectical convenience to say that the gift discourse is a discourse from 
Mauss to Derrida. Mauss poses the question; Derrida suggests a final answer. The 
question is: What is to be sought in the gift? Or, what relationship complication or 
complex does it reveal? After the question is posed, thinkers start to think their 
individual ways through the question. Before suggesting an answer, Derrida first 
points to us: the talk of gift is not an end in the gift itself. He then speaks of the 
impossibility of the gift, and then ends in his discussion in the gift of death. It is in the 
finalization of the gift of death when he asserts the gift of death alone helps us 
understand who we are, how we are unique, and how we are related to others (The 
Gift of Death 51). (This is why he resorts to love for the ultimate answer to human 
relationships, for he thinks that love enables all these, including the gift of death.) The 
gift discourse is a discourse from Mauss to mort. It starts from Mauss’ anthropological 
observation and proceeds to Derrida’s philosophical association of the gift and death. 
And there’s more. There is more between Mauss and mort that shows us the 
possibilities and impossibility of the gift. Through Levinas, the otherness in the gift is 
revealed. By Cixous, the gift discourse becomes gendered. In Hyde, the possibilities 
between the gift and art creation are dealt with. Bataille forwards the issue to its 
positives, negatives, and vagueness. Bourdieu focuses on the economic and emotive 
burdens of the gift. The list extends enormously. All these form the joint devotion to 
the gift discourse and its theoretic polyvalence. In light of these various aspects of the Dahn 104
gift, this thesis hopes that the story of Salomé can be read to its full. 
The immediacy and simplicity of the story plot of Salomé enable us to focus 
more on the theoretical reading of the gifting relationships in the story than on the 
mere story line. With each link of the whole gift circle taken apart, the story is better 
examined and understood in its diverse aspects. 
Through Mauss’ introduction of the gifting terms, we come to see that the story 
of Salomé is capable of such a reading. The ideas of the potlatch, obligations, kula, 
and hau, each finds their embodiment in the story. Mauss’ point of view helps us see 
the potentiality of a gift reading applicable to the biblical story and presents the 
structure of the story with striking similarities to that of a gift society. Without Mauss, 
the significance of the story shall be considerably diminished. The story of Salomé 
might be understood as a sequence of cause and effect propelled by revenge. While 
under the reading of gift theory, the story not only offers even more explanations to 
the reader, but also presents itself as a gift circle of hau that binds all parties involved. 
The story becomes an account of a traveling spirit who aims to give. Starting from 
Mauss, the story has varied afar from its original biblical nature. 
The gift of birth in the story is placed under discussion in the view of Levinas 
and Cixous. Without their theoretical devotion, the mother-daughter relationship can 
only be taken for granted or inscribed to Freudian studies. With their keen observation 
and shrewd insight, the gift-giving of birth is not only an ethical, social, but also a 
gendered focus. It is the gift theory that furthers the discussion over the relation 
between Herodias and Salomé. 
The gift of dance by Salomé is examined under Hyde’s view of art as a gift. How 
is art or a performance, say, a dance, presented as a gift? We owe this enlightenment 
to Hyde. Furthermore, the blurred distinction between the gift and the giver, the work 
of art and the artist, is also made clear by Hyde’s understanding of the gift. The dance Dahn 105
is taken into the gift discourse through the assistance of Hyde. 
The vicious circle of gift-giving that was first noticed by Mauss is again stressed 
by Bourdieu. Through Bourdieu, the dark side of the Salomé story is revealed and the 
bipolar nature of the gift is distinguished. It is the negative side of the gift emphasized 
by Bourdieu, among other scholars, that helps contrast and remind one of the idea of a 
genuine gift. The distinction between the two gifts brings out the issue of 
misrecognition in the story. Bourdieu’s misrecognition is a key to the understanding 
of Salomé’s obedience to Herodias and to the understanding of their relationships as 
family and business partners. Without Bourdieu, the contradiction between the true 
gift and the false gift in the Salomé story may hardly come to a resolution. 
Bataille’s concept of expenditure in the gift issue is what we most rely on for the 
interpretation of John’s martyrdom as a gift. John’s death is seen as a form of devotion 
out of Christian charity. His defiance to authority and will to righteousness is related 
to the idea of spiritual expenditure which is a forceful drive to serve and share love 
and justice. From this point of departure, the trip of hau, formerly discussed in the 
chapter of Mauss is again under discussion, concerning the death of John as a 
three-fold gift. 
The most thought-provoking interpretation of the whole story is still that derived 
from Derrida, for he attempts an answer so unexpected by all means. The whole 
philosophical reasoning of the gift issue itself and the gift issue in the Salomé story is 
diverted into a course of love. Through his understanding of another example taken 
from the Bible, Derrida explains how the impossible gift becomes possible in the hand 
of Abraham. While the biblical story of Abraham encourages a Derridian view on the 
story of Salomé, it is actually at the same time a shock to find out Derrida’s final 
resort to love for the conclusion of the gift. 
It is certain that the sacrifice of John and the moral burden of Salomé are Dahn 106
assumed out of love. It is all the more obvious that the premise of the impossible gift 
is a search for the key to possibilities—love. While all is clarified by the finale of the 
Derridian discussion of the gift, the message of love starts to make sense in the gift 
discourse, in the Abraham’s story, and in the Salomé’s story. The gift, in the end, is 
not about the impossibility of the gift. It is about the possibility of love. Everything 
seems to come back to the concern of human relationships. This seems to be the gist 
intended by the philosopher as a gift. 
The story of Salomé and the gift theory along the discussion of the thesis turn out 
synergistic. As the theory reveals more interpretations of the story, the story brings out 
more aspects of the theory. The quest to the full understanding of the story is at the 
end a quest to the full understanding of the theory. As Greenwood puts it, the quest to 
the full understanding of the gift is a quest to the full understanding of the indefinable. 
What matters is never what is there to be known. What matters is “the quest to know 
it keeps alive the passion for it” (174). Our quest to the understanding of the Salomé 
story, together with the quest to the understanding of the gift, consequently aims to 
unfold even more possibilities and to keep active the faith in love. The spirit to give, 
to love, to dedicate oneself, to the benefits of others or even to the sacrifice for others 
can be concluded and consummated in the saying: “Love is, above all, the gift of 
oneself.”
39  That is to say, the true gift is a giving out of oneself, and this is only 
possible while being motivated by love. Love is the message sent out by the 
philosopher for the key to the answer. 
 
 
                                                 
39  The noted English saying is actually taken from part of a sentence in Ardèle ou la Marguerite p.79 
(Ardèle; The Cry of the Peacock, 1948) by Jean Anouilh. The complete sentence is: “You know it well 
that love is, above all, a gift of oneself!” (“Vous savez bien que l'amour, c'est avant tout le don de 
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